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Abstract: Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming that 
learning will have converged to one; or in settings where that is implausible, that equilibrium 
approximates people’s strategic thinking without learning. Yet recent experimental work 
suggests that initial responses to many kinds of games deviate systematically from equilibrium, 
and that certain nonequilibrium models can then out-predict equilibrium models of thinking. 
Even when learning converges to equilibrium, such nonequilibrium models of initial responses 
allow better prediction of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper reviews recent 
theoretical and empirical work on nonequilibrium models of strategic thinking and illustrates 
their applications in economics.  
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1.  Introduction 
  Strategic thinking pervades human interaction. As soon as children develop enough “theory 
of mind” to model other people as independent decision makers, they must be taught to look both 
ways before crossing one-way streets—suggesting that they instinctively assume rationality in 
predicting others’ decisions.
2
  The canonical model of strategic thinking is the game-theoretic notion of Nash equilibrium, 
defined as a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s strategy 
maximizes his expected payoff, given the others’ strategies. Although equilibrium can be defined 
and applied without reference to its interpretation, it is best thought of as an “equilibrium in 
beliefs,” in which players who are rational in the decision-theoretic sense have beliefs about each 
other’s strategies that are correct, given the rational strategy choices they imply. 
 Our adult attempts to predict other people’s responses to incentives 
are shaped by similar, though usually more subtle, rationality-based inferences. 
  In games, rationality alone seldom restricts behavior enough to be useful. Equilibrium 
therefore augments rationality with the “rational-expectations” assumption that players’ beliefs 
are correct.
3
  Although equilibrium is almost universally assumed in applications, it is better justified in 
some than others. When players have abundant prior experience with perfectly analogous games, 
both theory and experimental results suggest that under mild assumptions about cognition, 
learning has a strong tendency to converge to equilibrium (e.g. Drew Fudenberg and David K. 
Levine 1998; Camerer 2003, Chapter 6; Camerer and Ho 1999).
 The structure this adds often gives a precise and plausible account of strategic 
behavior; and the generality, simplicity, and tractability of equilibrium analysis have made it the 
method of choice in strategic applications (Roger B. Myerson 1999). 
4
  However, in many settings players’ interactions have only imperfect precedents, or none at 
all. If assuming equilibrium is justified in such settings, it must be via strategic thinking rather 
than learning. The literature on epistemic game theory (e.g. Adam Brandenburger 1992) gives 
conditions under which reasoning based on iterated knowledge of rationality and beliefs focuses 
 
                                                 
2 In this case their reliance on rationality is excessive, which is why adults have something to teach them. This example originally 
appeared in Camerer (2003, Chapter 1), courtesy of one of the authors. 
3 Even common knowledge of rationality implies only that players’ strategies are rationalizable (Bernheim 1984 and David 
Pearce 1984), which leaves behavior completely unrestricted in many games of interest to economists. Because many 
interesting games have multiple equilibria, equilibrium is often further augmented by refinements, as in Eric Van Damme 
(1987) or John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (1987), with the goal of deriving unique predictions. 
4 In reinforcement learning, for example, players need not even know that they are playing a game. Our statement omits some 
qualifications that are important only for extensive-form games.   3 
players’ beliefs on a particular equilibrium, even in their initial responses to a game. But in many 
games such reasoning is complex, making the thinking justification for equilibrium behaviorally 
far less plausible than the learning justification is when players have abundant prior experience. 
  This makes the desirability of improving upon equilibrium models of initial responses clear 
in applications involving novel games.
5
  Even those who grant the potential desirability of improving upon equilibrium models of 
initial responses may doubt its feasibility. How can any model systematically out-predict a 
rational-expectations notion such as equilibrium? And how can one identify simple models that 
allow such improvements among the huge number of logically possible nonequilibrium models? 
We suspect that when equilibrium is assumed despite weak justification, or when the scope of its 
learning justification is overestimated, it is because analysts hope equilibrium will still be correct 
on average, or fear that without equilibrium there can be no basis for analysis. 
 But better models of initial responses may help even in 
applications where it is reasonable to assume that learning has already converged to equilibrium. 
In many such applications, an equilibrium is selected from multiple possibilities via history-
dependent learning dynamics, whose limiting outcome is influenced by players’ initial responses 
(Crawford 1995; John Van Huyck, Joseph Cook, and Raymond Battalio 1997). And in other 
applications, such as the FCC spectrum auction (R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan 1996), 
initial responses are important for their own sake. In either case, better models of strategic 
thinking allow more useful predictions than those based on equilibrium analysis alone. 
  Yet there is now a large body of experimental research that studies strategic thinking by 
eliciting initial responses to games, which suggests that in many applications in which 
equilibrium is assumed, neither the hope nor the fear is justified. This paper reviews the 
theoretical and experimental/empirical research on strategic thinking and explores its 
implications for modeling strategic behavior.
6
                                                 
5An analysis of strategic thinking may also eventually add to our understanding of learning from imperfect analogies as well, but 
that possibility will not be discussed here. Such analysis can also yield insights into cognition that elucidate the structure of 
learning rules, where assumptions about cognition determine which analogies between current and previous games players 
recognize and sharply distinguish reinforcement from beliefs-based and more sophisticated rules.  
 
6 See also the important contribution of Camerer, Ho, and Juin Kuan Chong (2004) and other contributions summarized in 
Camerer (2003, Chapter 5) and Crawford (1997, Sections 4 and 5). Although most empirical work in economics has relied on 
field data, laboratory experiments have played the leading role in empirical work on strategic behavior. Because behavior in 
games is notoriously sensitive to the details of the environment, strategic models carry a heavy informational burden, which is 
often compounded in the field by an inability to observe all relevant variables. Important advances in experimental methods 
over the past few decades allow a control that often gives experiments a decisive advantage in identifying the relationship 
between behavior and the environment. We discuss clear evidence from field data below whenever possible, but the bulk of 
our discussion of necessity concerns experimental data.    4 
  The experimental research shows with progressively increasing clarity that people’s 
responses to novel games often deviate systematically from equilibrium. The results also show 
that the deviations have a large structural component that can be modeled in a simple way: 
Thinking systematically avoids the fixed-point or indefinitely iterated dominance reasoning that 
equilibrium sometimes requires, in favor of rules of thumb that anchor beliefs in an instinctive 
reaction to the game and then adjust them via a small number of iterated best responses.
7
  These rules of thumb—called “types” in this context (no relation to players’ private-
information variables)—are cognitively simple, have strong intuitive appeal, and correspond 
closely to clear informal descriptions of strategic thinking. Although people’s thinking is 
typically heterogeneous, their types are drawn from a population distribution concentrated on 
one to three best-response iterations. The results identify a class of “level-k” or “cognitive 
hierarchy” (“CH”) models that share the generality and much of the simplicity and tractability of 
equilibrium analysis, but which can in many settings systematically out-predict equilibrium.
  
8
  Although level-k/CH models are alternatives to equilibrium analysis, they generalize 
equilibrium rather than replacing it. Level-k types are rational in the sense of best-responding to 
some beliefs; they depart from equilibrium only in that their beliefs are derived from simplified, 
nonequilibrium models of other players.
      
9
  We stress that while level-k/CH models appear to predict a sizeable fraction of the deviations 
from equilibrium in many settings, they stop well short of predicting all deviations in all settings. 
 In sufficiently simple games, the low-level types that 
describe most subjects’ behavior mimic equilibrium strategy choices, even though they deviate 
from equilibrium thinking. But in more complex games, some or all such types may deviate 
systematically from equilibrium choices. Importantly, the models not only predict that such 
deviations will sometimes occur: They also identify which settings evoke deviations; what forms 
they take; and, given the population type frequencies, with what frequencies they occur. 
                                                 
7 As Selten (1998) put it, “Basic concepts in game theory are often circular in the sense that they are based on definitions by 
implicit properties…. Boundedly rational strategic reasoning seems to avoid circular concepts. It directly results in a 
procedure by which a problem solution is found.” We stress that there is no implication that learning cannot make people 
converge to something that an analyst would need fixed-point or multiple-round reasoning to characterize; just that such 
reasoning does not directly describe most people’s thinking. Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Bruno Broseta (2001, Table II) 
show that reliance on iterated dominance seldom goes beyond three rounds.  
8 In applications the behavioral parameters that describe this distribution are usually estimated from the data or calibrated using 
previous estimates. Although estimates vary somewhat across settings and populations, in most applications a stable 
distribution that puts significant probability only on the lowest levels captures the main deviations from equilibrium. We 
illustrate this below by using a representative constant calibration whenever possible. 
9 Type level-k (though not its CH counterpart beyond k = 1) respects k-rationalizability, the condition that corresponds in two-
person games to the result of k rounds or iterated deletion of dominated strategies (Bernheim 1984).   5 
Even so, we view it as encouraging that models as simple and tractable as these are can predict 
something as elusive as deviations from equilibrium. Moreover, the experimental results also 
suggest that the strategic thinking-related deviations the models do not predict may have little 
structure that can be predicted by models of comparable generality. Thus, level-k/CH models 
generalize equilibrium analysis in a way that is likely to be useful in settings where deviations 
from equilibrium are important, while ignoring little that cannot reasonably be modeled as errors. 
We therefore believe there is a strong case for adding such models to the analyst’s toolkit.   
  Our discussion will illustrate several ways in which a level-k/CH analysis can improve upon 
an equilibrium analysis. In settings where the types that best describe most subjects’ behavior 
mimic equilibrium choices, a level-k/CH analysis can establish the robustness of equilibrium 
predictions to deviations from their strong behavioral assumptions.
10
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. To keep the discussion manageable, except as 
noted we assume that players have accurate models of the games they play and that, except for 
errors, their strategies are rational responses to some beliefs about others’ strategies.
 In settings where it is 
implausible to assume equilibrium, a level-k/CH analysis can challenge equilibrium predictions 
and resolve empirical puzzles by explaining the deviations from equilibrium some games evoke. 
Level-k/CH models also give a more plausible view of coordination than a traditional analysis of 
equilibrium selection. And finally, such models elucidate the effects of strategic communication 
in both “outguessing” games, where deception is an important factor that is ruled out by 
assuming equilibrium; and coordination games, where reassurance and symmetry-breaking are 
potentially important but have unrealistically limited scope when equilibrium is assumed.   
11
  Section 2 reviews the leading alternative models of strategic thinking, their cognitive 
requirements, and how they are implemented in applications. We start with equilibrium and 
continue with finitely iterated dominance and k-rationalizability (Bernheim 1984 and Pearce 
1984); quantal response equilibrium (“QRE”; Richard S. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey 
1995); level-k (Rosemarie Nagel 1995, Dale O. Stahl and Paul Wilson 1994, 1995, Costa-
Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 2001, Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006) and CH (Camerer, Ho, 
 We also 
focus on normal-form games, including extensive-form games only to study communication. 
                                                 
10 The robustness then resembles that established by a rationalizability-based analysis; but as we will see, a level-k /CH analysis 
adds useful structure, and its results may well deviate from equilibrium-based conclusions.   
11 Although people do sometimes misperceive the games they are playing or deviate from decision-theoretic rationality in the 
sense of best responses to some beliefs, and such misperceptions or deviations might interact with strategic thinking, those 
factors are conceptually distinct from our focus of thinking about others’ responses to incentives.   6 
and Chong 2004) models; and  noisy introspection models (“NI”; Jacob K. Goeree and Charles 
A. Holt 2004). 
  The remaining sections interweave experimental evidence with strategic and economic 
applications, ordering topics by strategic rather than economic issues.
12
  Throughout the paper, the experimental evidence is linked to informal evidence from “folk 
game theory”, which illustrates the need for nonequilibrium models of strategic thinking, the 
issues that a successful model must address, and the range of potential applications. 
 
  Our term is meant to suggest an analogy with folk physics, untrained people’s intuitive 
beliefs about the laws of physics. Why study folk instead of “real” game theory? Folk physics is 
an imperfect reflection of real physics, but it yields considerable insight into human cognition. 
Folk game theory is an imperfect reflection of traditional game theory, but unlike folk physics it 
is a direct reflection of its observable counterpart, namely the part of behavioral game theory that 
concerns strategic thinking. Moreover, we shall argue that folk game theory provides powerful 
additional evidence for the lessons from experimental evidence about strategic thinking.
13
  Section 3 introduces the experimental evidence on strategic thinking, starting with guessing 
games in the style of Keynes’ (1936, Chapter 12) beauty-contest example and other guessing and 
normal-form games with complete information (Nagel 1995; Stahl and Wilson 1994, 1995; Ho, 
Camerer, and Keith Weigelt 1998; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 2001; Antoni Bosch-
Domènech et al. 2002; Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006; and Costa-Gomes and Georg 
Weizsäcker 2008). This evidence generally favors level-k/CH models over the alternatives.  
  
  Section 4 illustrates the workings of level-k/CH and alternative models in more detail, 
considering complete-information outguessing games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria such 
as perturbed Matching Pennies, in which the key issue is how to respond to payoff asymmetries. 
In such games level-k/CH models’ predictions “quasi-purify” something roughly like a mixed-
strategy equilibrium via the predictable heterogeneity of players’ strategic thinking, while 
avoiding some implausible comparative statics implications of equilibrium. 
                                                 
12 Level-k/CH aficionados will see that the topics are grouped by the principles by which the anchoring L0 type is specified, and 
ordered to facilitate explaining to non-aficionados how the models work and their economic implications.    
13 Michael Suk-Young Chwe (2010) gives a fascinating complementary discussion of folk game theory. We note that there may 
be selection effects, in that level-k reasoning may be easier to express in aphorisms than other kinds of strategic thinking. It 
may also be that people who have studied level-k models as much as we have are more likely to notice them in other people’s 
writings. Even so, we think the extent to which folk game theory supports level-k models is surprising and informative.        7 
  Although most laboratory evidence on strategic thinking comes from designs that induce 
symmetric information, most field evidence comes from settings with clear informational 
asymmetries. Section 5 extends level-k/CH models to allow asymmetric information and to use 
the models to interpret the data from experiments and field settings. It first discusses evidence 
from experiments on leading examples of games with informational asymmetries: zero-sum 
betting (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004 and Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo, Camerer, and 
Stephanie W. Wang 2010) and auctions with private information (Crawford and Iriberri 2007a). 
It then discusses the use of such models to analyze field data (Robert Östling, Joseph Tao-Yi 
Wang, Eileen Chou, and Camerer Forthcoming, and Alexander Brown, Camerer, and Dan 
Lovallo 2010). Section 5 concludes by discussing the design of revenue-maximizing auctions 
with level-k bidders (Crawford, Tamar Kugler, Zvika Neeman, and Ady Pauzner 2009).    
  Section 6 uses level-k/CH models to analyze coordination via symmetry-breaking. Following 
Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004, Section III.C), complete-information versions of the models are 
used to explain the remarkable experimental results of Amnon Rapoport et al. (1998), Daniel 
Kahneman (1998), and Rapoport and Darryl A. Seale (2002), in which subjects playing Battle-
of-the-Sexes or n–person market entry games achieve systematically better ex post coordination 
than in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium benchmark. Section 6 then reviews recent 
work that uses incomplete-information CH models to analyze field evidence from market entry 
games (Avi Goldfarb and Botao Yang 2009; Goldfarb and Mo Xiao 2011).  
  Section 7 uses level-k/CH models to study coordination via assurance in Stag Hunt games 
with structures like Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig’s (1983) model of bank runs. 
The workhorse model of behavior in bank runs games has been “global games” (Hans Carlsson 
and Eric van Damme 1993, Carlsson and Mattias Ganslandt 1998, Stephen Morris and Hyun 
Song Shin 1998, and David M. Frankel, Morris, and Ady Pauzner 2003), which achieves unique 
equilibrium selection without refinements via noncooperative arguments, which selection in 
simple bank-runs games coincides with risk-dominance. We argue in Section 7 that the global 
games approach viewed as a model of initial responses—as it must be to describe bank runs—
has questionable behavioral foundations. 
  We then reconsider the global games approach from the viewpoint of level-k/CH models, 
with the goal of evaluating its robustness to failures of the equilibrium assumption or its model 
of equilibrium selection. The level-k/CH approach yields a quite different view of the process of   8 
coordination than the global-games approach, whose conclusions are nonetheless strikingly 
similar in the simplest bank-runs games. However, in more complex games equilibrium selection 
may not follow predictions based on risk-dominance or global games; and a level-k/CH analysis 
highlights an issue that is not considered in the global-games literature, how players model the 
correlation of others’ strategy choices, on which the evidence challenges the standard view. 
  For settings involving market entry games, coordination games, or auctions in which 
equilibrium seems implausible, recent work has proposed “incomplete” models based on k-
rationalizability (Andres Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer 2008; Federico Ciliberto and Tamer 2009). 
Other work has used the flexibility of incomplete models for settings where some equilibrium 
seems likely to emerge but equilibrium selection seems difficult to predict (Timothy F. 
Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss 1991; Steve Berry and Elie Tamer 2006; Federico Echenique and 
Ivana Komunjer 2009). Although incomplete models have been extremely useful in econometric 
analyses of individual decisions (Charles F. Manski 2007), in strategic settings their prediction 
ambiguity often “multiplies up” to the point where rationalizability or equilibrium unaugmented 
by a model of selection yields very weak identification. This problem is illustrated by Aradillas-
Lopez and Tamer’s (2008) analyses of market entry and auction games. Section 8 considers the 
benefits for identification and estimation of using level-k/CH models as structural alternatives to 
such incomplete models, as in Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Iriberri’s (2009) analysis of 
coordination games and Gillen’s (2010) analysis of auctions. 
  Sections 9 and 10 consider the new issues raised by games played on non-neutral salience 
landscapes. Section 9 discusses complete-information hide-and-seek and outguessing games 
where the key issue is how to respond to salience (Ariel Rubinstein 1999 and Crawford and 
Iriberri 2007b). Section 10 considers complete-information coordination games à la Thomas C. 
Schelling (1960), with asymmetric tensions between Schelling salience and the inherent salience 
of higher own payoffs (Crawford, Uri Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich 2008).  
  Sections 11 to 13 consider models of strategic communication. Section 11 considers 
deception via communication of intentions in outguessing games (Crawford 2003). Section 12 
studies communication of intentions in coordination games (Crawford 2007 and Tore Ellingsen 
and Robert Östling 2010). Section 13 studies communication of private information in sender-
receiver games (Crawford 2003 and Joseph T.-Y. Wang, Michael Spezio, and Camerer 2010).  
  Section 14 is the conclusion.    9 
2. Alternative Models of Strategic Thinking 
  Until recently the choices for modeling nonequilibrium initial responses to games were quite 
limited, but now there are several alternatives. This section sets the stage by reviewing them, 
their cognitive requirements, and how they are implemented in applications. We start with 
equilibrium and continue with finitely iterated (strict) dominance and k-rationalizability, quantal 
response equilibrium, level-k and cognitive hierarchy, and noisy introspection models.  
2.1. Equilibrium plus Noise 
  Any notion that is to be taken to data must allow for errors in some way. The most obvious 
choice, “equilibrium plus noise”, adds errors with a specified distribution with zero mean and 
estimated precision to equilibrium predictions. The distribution is often allowed to be sensitive to 
the payoff costs of deviations, as with logit errors; but in equilibrium plus noise, unlike in the 
QRE models discussed in Section 2.3, the payoff costs of a player’s deviations from equilibrium 
are evaluated assuming that other players play their equilibrium strategies without errors. 
  In judging theories of strategic thinking, cognitive requirements are relevant because if a 
theory is not consistent with a player’s thinking, it will predict behavior accurately in general 
only by chance. In particular, no “as if” thinking justification for equilibrium is plausible because 
if a player’s thinking does not accurately model others’ strategy choices, then except in games 
where the rules he follows mimic equilibrium, he will deviate systematically. Depending on the 
game, an equilibrium player can find his equilibrium decision via one of several methods, which 
sometimes require fixed-point or indefinitely iterated dominance reasoning. The more complex 
this reasoning becomes, the less behaviorally plausible it is as a model of thinking.        
   In many applications equilibrium plus noise fits experimental results well. But even in games 
with unique equilibria, subjects’ initial responses often deviate systematically from equilibrium, 
in ways that are sensitive not only to a given subject’s out-of-equilibrium payoffs when others 
play their equilibrium strategies but also to his out-of-equilibrium payoffs when others do not 
play their equilibrium strategies. Further, in games with multiple equilibria equilibrium plus 
noise is incomplete in that it does not specify a unique prediction conditional on the values of its 
behavioral parameters (in this case, the error precision). Such multiplicity has been dealt with by 
estimating an unrestricted probability distribution over equilibria (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991), 
but such a model may overfit the data (Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Iriberri 2009). With 
multiple equilibria, to put equilibrium plus noise on an equal footing with the other models   10 
considered here, which except for k-rationalizability are complete, it is natural to add a 
coordination refinement such as Harsanyi and Selten’s (1987) risk- or payoff-dominance. 
2.2. Finitely Iterated Strict Dominance and k-Rationalizability 
  A common, plausible reaction to the behavioral implausibility of the thinking justification for 
equilibrium is to maintain some or all of equilibrium’s reliance on players’ rationality and 
iterated mutual knowledge of rationality while relaxing its strong rational-expectations 
assumption that players’ beliefs are correct. This leads to set-valued restrictions on individual 
players’ strategies derived from iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and the 
associated notions of rationalizability and k-rationalizability (Bernheim 1984 and Pearce 1984).
14
  k-rationalizability reflects the implications of finite levels of mutual knowledge of rationality: 
A 1-rationalizable strategy is one for which there is a profile of others’ strategies that make it a 
best response; a 2-rationalizable strategy is one for which there is a profile of others’ 1-
rationalizable strategies that make it a best response; and so on. Rationalizability is equivalent to 
k-rationalizability for all k, reflecting the implications of common knowledge (indefinite levels 
of mutual knowledge) of rationality with no further restrictions on beliefs. 
 
  Equilibrium, by contrast, reflects the implications of common knowledge of rationality plus 
mutual knowledge of beliefs. Any equilibrium strategy is trivially k-rationalizable for all k, but 
not all combinations of rationalizable strategies are in equilibrium. However, in games that are 
strictly dominance-solvable in k rounds, k-rationalizability implies that players have the same 
beliefs—with an unimportant qualification for mixed-strategy equilibrium—so that any 
combination of k-rationalizable strategies is in equilibrium. 
  In other games k-rationalizability and even rationalizability allow deviations from 
equilibrium. Consider Matching Pennies, in which the Row player wins by matching (on Heads 
or Tails) and the Column player wins by mismatching. This game has a unique equilibrium, but 
for either player any strategy, pure or mixed, is rationalizable, and therefore k–rationalizable.
15
                                                 
14 Equilibrium plus noise and QRE, by contrast, restrict the relationship among players’ strategies. The level-k, CH, and NI 
models discussed below normally make unique (though possibly probabilistic) predictions conditional on their behavioral 
parameters, as does equilibrium plus noise when completed by adding a refinement. Finitely iterated strict dominance and k-
rationalizability are equivalent in two-person games; their differences in n–person games are unimportant for our purposes. 
 
To see that Heads, for instance, is rationalizable for Row or Column, note that Heads is rational 
for Column on the belief that Row will play Tails, which is rational for Row on the belief that 
15 That the equilibrium is in mixed strategies may make the example seem special, but the same point could be made in a larger 
game with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.   11 
Column will play Tails, and so on. In this way one can construct a “tower”, or more precisely a 
“helix”, of beliefs that are consistent with iterated knowledge of rationality at all levels, hence 
with common knowledge of rationality, to support any outcome, equilibrium or not. Importantly, 
however, the beliefs that support many rationalizable outcomes are behaviorally implausible in 
that (as in the tower/helix) they rest on rationality-based inferences at unrealistically high levels 
and/or they cycle from level to level. A possible remedy is to combine rationality with 
empirically based restrictions on beliefs, as in the level-k and CH models discussed below.    
  Finitely iterated dominance and k-rationalizability weaken equilibrium enough to be 
consistent with most of the systematic patterns in subjects’ deviations from equilibrium. Their 
weakness in Matching Pennies, where they imply no restrictions on behavior, is not entirely 
typical; though this extreme weakness extends to many games with unique pure-strategy 
equilibria and to most coordination games. One interesting approach is to take applications such 
as first-price auctions or market-entry games where the weakness is less extreme, accept the set-
valued restrictions implied by k-rationalizability, and combine them, otherwise agnostically, 
with an econometric error structure. We discuss such approaches in Section 8. 
2.3. Quantal Response Equilibrium (“QRE”) 
  To capture the sensitivity of subjects’ deviations from equilibrium to a subject’s out-of-
equilibrium payoffs when others may deviate from their equilibrium strategies, McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1995) proposed the notion of QRE. In a QRE players’ decisions are noisy, with the 
probability density of each decision increasing in its expected payoff, evaluated taking the 
noisiness of others’ decisions into account (its key difference from equilibrium plus noise). A 
QRE is a fixed point in the space of decision distributions, with each player’s distribution a noisy 
best response to the others’. As the distributions’ precision increases, QRE converges to 
equilibrium without noise; and as the precision approaches zero, QRE converges to uniform 
randomization over players’ feasible strategies. A QRE model is closed by specifying a response 
distribution, which is logit in almost all applications. The resulting logit QRE or “LQRE” usually 
responds to out-of-equilibrium payoffs in plausible ways.
16
                                                 
16 McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) suggest using LQRE for both initial responses and limiting outcomes, with increasing precision 
as a reduced-form model of learning. But although LQRE has until recently been the most popular model of initial responses, 
not all researchers consider it suitable for that purpose. Goeree and Holt (2004) suggest reserving LQRE for limiting 
outcomes, and instead propose an NI model (Section 2.6) to describe initial responses. 
   12 
  In applications LQRE’s precision is calibrated from previous analyses or determined by 
fitting the model to the data. Like equilibrium plus noise, LQRE is a general model of strategic 
behavior with a small number of behavioral parameters. Because it responds to all out-of-
equilibrium payoffs in plausible ways, LQRE often fits subjects’ initial responses better than 
equilibrium plus noise (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Goeree and Holt 2001; Georg Weizsäcker 
2003; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 2008; Sections 4 and 5). But in some settings LQRE fits worse 
than equilibrium, even making errors that consistently deviate from equilibrium in the opposite 
direction from observed deviations (Chong, Camerer, and Ho 2005; Crawford and Iriberri 2007b, 
Online Appendix; Östling et al. Forthcoming, Section 5). 
  The probability densities of QRE decisions respond to their expected payoffs evaluated 
taking the noisiness of others’ decisions into account. This feature, which is essential to QRE’s 
ability to describe deviations from equilibrium, makes QRE’s predictions highly sensitive to the 
distributional assumptions—unlike in quantal response models of individual decisions where the 
choice probabilities can be consistently estimated with the mean error constrained to zero but in 
an otherwise distribution-free way; or in other models of strategic thinking, except for NI 
(Section 2.6). Philip Haile, Ali Hortaçsu, and Grigory Kosenok (2008) assess the strength of this 
sensitivity, showing that without further distributional assumptions, QRE can “explain” any 
given dataset with one observation per game-player pair. This result is disturbing because there 
is little theory to guide the specification of error distributions (see however Lars-Göran Mattsson 
and Jörgen Weibull 2002), and the use of the logit distribution in QRE analyses has been guided 
by fit and custom rather than independent evidence. However, Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005) 
have shown that QRE with no specific distributional assumptions but a natural monotonicity 
restriction on responses to payoffs does imply some distribution-free restrictions even for data 
from a single game-player pair; and that even without such restrictions QRE does have testable 
cross-game implications. Even so, QRE’s point predictions are much more sensitive to 
distributional assumptions than level-k/CH predictions. 
  With regard to cognitive requirements, no matter how simple the structure of the game, an 
LQRE player must both respond to a complex probability distribution of other players’ responses 
and find his part of a generalized equilibrium that is a fixed point in a very large space of 
response distributions. If equilibrium reasoning is cognitively taxing enough to make it 
behaviorally implausible, LQRE reasoning is doubly taxing; and LQRE is less behaviorally   13 
plausible as a model of thinking than equilibrium. Further, the mathematical complexity of 
LQRE means that it must usually be solved for computationally and is not easily adapted to 
theoretical analysis (see however Simon P. Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 2001 and Kang-Oh Yi 
2003, who characterize LQRE analytically in settings like those discussed in Section 7). 
  2.4. Level-k Models  
  Motivated by these considerations and experimental evidence, a different vein of work on 
strategic thinking considers models that treat deviations from equilibrium as an integral part of 
the structure, rather than as errors or responses to errors. Although the number of logically 
possible nonequilibrium structures seems daunting, both experimental evidence and folk game 
theory support a particular class of models called level-k models (or CH models, Section 2.5). 
These models also alleviate the cognitive and computational complexity concerns noted above.  
  In a level-k model players’ types are heterogeneous, but each player’s type is drawn from a 
common distribution. Type Lk anchors its beliefs in a nonstrategic L0 type, which represents 
players’ models of others’ instinctive reactions to the game. Type Lk then adjusts its beliefs via 
thought-experiments with iterated best responses: L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and so on. 
These empirically motivated assumptions about beliefs rule out the rationality-based inferences 
at unrealistically high levels and the persistent cycling from level to level that rationalizability 
allows, without relying on the behaviorally implausible cross-player interactions that drive 
epistemic justifications of equilibrium strategic thinking.  
  In applications it is usually assumed that L1 and higher types make errors, often taken to be 
logit as in equilibrium plus logit noise or LQRE. The population type frequencies are inferred 
from data-fitting exercises or calibrated from previous analyses. The estimated frequency of L0 
is usually zero or small, so that L0 “exists” mainly as L1’s model of others, L2’s model of L1’s 
model of others, and so on. The type distribution is fairly stable across settings, with most weight 
on L1, L2, and perhaps L3. 
  Even though L0 normally has a low frequency, its specification is the main issue in defining 
a level-k model and the key to its explanatory power. As illustrated below, L0 needs to be 
adapted to the setting, and there is an emerging consensus about how to do this in particular 
applications. The instinctive reactions may follow one of several principles, such as uniform 
randomness as in our first illustrations in Sections 3 through 7, or attraction to salience or   14 
truthfulness as illustrated in Sections 9 through 13. By contrast, the definition of L1, L2, and L3 
via iterated best responses allows a reliable explanation of behavior across different settings. 
  Unlike equilibrium and LQRE players, level-k types have a simple recursive structure. 
Iterating best responses a small number of times is cognitively easy in most games, and avoids 
the common criticism of LQRE that finding a fixed point in the space of distributions or 
performing many rounds of iterated dominance is too taxing for a realistic model of strategic 
thinking. Moreover, a level-k player need not respond to the noisiness of others’ choices or a 
nondegenerate distribution of them, except for L1’s response to a random L0, which is easy. 
  Like equilibrium players, L1 and higher types are rational, with perfect models of the game. 
Their only departure from equilibrium is replacing its perfect model of others with a simplified 
model of others. L1 and higher types make undominated decisions, and Lk normally respects k 
rounds of iterated dominance (without performing them), so its decisions are k–rationalizable. 
  A distribution of level-k types that is concentrated on low levels of k as the evidence suggests 
mimics equilibrium in games that are dominance-solvable in a few rounds. But it deviates 
systematically in some more complex games, in ways that are sensitive to a subject’s out-of-
equilibrium payoffs when others may deviate from their equilibrium strategies. This allows the 
deterministic structures of level-k and CH models (Section 2.5) to capture the sensitivity of 
deviations from equilibrium to out-of-equilibrium payoffs, as the stochastic structure of LQRE 
does. All three models also often fit initial responses better than equilibrium plus noise.  
  Like equilibrium plus noise with a refinement that assures uniqueness, LQRE, and CH, level-
k models are general models of strategic behavior, applicable to “any” game, and have small 
numbers of behavioral parameters. Unlike QRE, level-k models make point (though usually 
probabilistic) predictions that depend only on L0 and the estimated type distribution, and not on 
the distributional assumptions or estimated precisions.
17
2.5. Cognitive Hierarchy (“CH”) Models 
 Level-k models’ freedom from 
distributional assumptions is a major advantage over QRE. We return to this issue in Section 8’s 
discussion of Ben Gillen’s (2010) nonequilibrium analysis of identification in auctions.  
  In Camerer, Ho, and Chong’s (2004) closely related CH model, type Lk best responds not to 
Lk-1 alone but to an estimated mixture of lower-level types, with the type frequencies treated as 
                                                 
17 Both LQRE and CH have fewer behavioral parameters but impose more restrictions than level-k models, for CH on the 
distribution of types, which is assumed to be Poisson; and for LQRE on the error distribution.   15 
a parameterized Poisson distribution. For an outside econometrician observer, this estimated- 
mixture specification seems more natural than the level-k specification. But which specification 
better describes people’s strategic thinking remains an empirical question, on which the jury is 
still out as explained below. A CH L1 is the same as a level-k L1 by definition, but a CH L2 or 
higher type may differ from its level-k counterpart. A CH L1 or higher type makes undominated 
decisions like its level-k counterpart. But unlike level-k types, a CH Lk need not always comply 
with k rounds of iterated dominance and k–rationalizability.
18
  In a CH model, unlike in a level-k model, L1 and higher types are assumed not to make 
errors. Instead the uniform random L0, which the Poisson distribution constrains to have positive 
frequency, doubles as an error structure for higher types. Section 2.4’s observations about the 
cognitive ease of level-k types apply to CH types, except that CH types above L1 respond not to 
a single lower type’s response but to a distribution of types’ responses, in proportions determined 
by an estimated Poisson parameter, assumed known by the player. CH types above L1, like 
level-k types, need not respond to the noisiness of others’ decisions or find fixed points.
 As Camerer, Ho, and Chong 
(2004, Section II.A) and Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005, Section 2.1) note, the beliefs of a CH 
Lk type converge to correct beliefs as k increases. By contrast, in some games the beliefs of a 
level-k type oscillate perpetually, and may converge only to the set of rationalizable beliefs.  
19
  Like a level-k model, given the Poisson distribution, a CH model makes point or mean 
predictions that do not depend on its estimated precision. But unlike a level-k model, and to 
some extent like QRE, the form of the distribution influences the model’s point predictions. In 
some applications the Poisson distribution is not very restrictive and a CH model fits as well as a 
level-k model and better than LQRE (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004, Section II.B; and Chong, 
Camerer, and Ho 2005); but in others the Poisson distribution seems overly restrictive (Chong, 
Camerer, and Ho 2005; Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006; Crawford and Iriberri 2007ab). 
 
                                                 
18 The increasing rationality of CH Lk types is important in some settings, as illustrated in Section 6; but because types higher 
than L3 are rare, we view the k-rationalizability of level-k types as more important in practice.     
19 Although we calibrate level-k models without errors in some of the illustrations below, this is not the usual practice in 
estimating them. Brian Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer (2009) identify a link between CH models and a generalization of LQRE 
that allows both heterogeneity of players’ precisions and truncation of their perceptions of others’ precisions as in Weizsäcker 
(2003). They also compare the models’ fits in matrix games and zero-sum betting games like those discussed in Section 5. The 
fits are very close, which the authors attribute to the fact that the heterogeneity and truncation that their generalization allow 
LQRE gives it a payoff-sensitivity that is not shared by CH in general, but happens to be shared in the games considered.   16 
2.6. Noisy Introspection (“NI”) Models 
  As noted in Section 2.3, although McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) suggest using LQRE for 
both initial responses and limiting outcomes, and LQRE has been the most popular model of 
initial responses, Goeree and Holt (2004) suggest reserving LQRE for limiting outcomes, instead 
proposing a noisy introspection (“NI”) model to describe initial responses. Their NI model 
relaxes LQRE’s equilibrium assumption by assuming that players form beliefs by iterating noisy 
best responses as in a level-k model, hence maintaining LQRE’s assumption that players respond 
to a nondegenerate probability distribution of others’ responses. Although Goeree and Holt 
motivate NI as a kind of noisy rationalizability, because it builds on iterated best responses and 
makes point predictions, up to errors, it is more akin to level-k and CH models. Higher-order 
beliefs are assumed to reflect increasing amounts of noise, converging to uniform randomness. 
  In the only applications so far, Goeree and Holt assume that the noisiness of higher-order 
beliefs grows geometrically with iterations, which yields beliefs similar but by no means 
identical to Lk’s; slower noise growth results in more iterated best responses, like a higher k. The 
resulting NI model is more flexible than LQRE, and cognitively less taxing because it requires 
no fixed-point reasoning; but it is more taxing than a level-k or CH model because players’ 
choices are indefinitely iterated best responses to noisy higher-order beliefs (although for 
computational purposes Goeree and Holt usually truncate the iteration to ten rounds). 
  For given noise distributions, the NI model makes probabilistic predictions that depend on 
how fast the noise grows. In the extreme case where the noise does not grow with the number of 
iterations, NI mimics LQRE. Other extremes mimic level-k types: If the noise jumps 
immediately to infinity, NI beliefs are like L1’s; if it is zero for one iteration and then jumps to 
infinity, NI beliefs are like L2’s, and so on; but these extremes are ruled out by the assumption 
that the noisiness of higher-order beliefs grows geometrically. 
   17 
3. Keynes’ Beauty Contest: 
Experimental Evidence from Guessing and Other Normal-Form Games  
 
“...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the 
competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize 
being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average 
preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those 
faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the 
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same 
point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are 
really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. 
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who 
practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” 
  —John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
“…imagine you are partners in a private business with a man named Mr. Market. Each 
day, he comes to your office or home and offers to buy your interest in the company or 
sell you his [the choice is yours]. The catch is, Mr. Market is an emotional wreck. At 
times, he suffers from excessive highs and at others, suicidal lows. When he is on one of 
his manic highs, his offering price for the business is high as well…. His outlook for the 
company is wonderful, so he is only willing to sell you his stake in the company at a 
premium. At other times, his mood goes south and all he sees is a dismal future for the 
company. In fact… he is willing to sell you his part of the company for far less than it is 
worth. All the while, the underlying value of the company may not have changed - just 




 The Intelligent Investor 
  The Keynes and Graham quotations evoke simultaneous-move n-person guessing or perhaps 
“outguessing” games, possibly with multiple equilibria. Like the quotations that follow, they 
concern games played without clear precedents. The key issue is anticipating others’ strategic 
responses, in Keynes’ case to a “landscape” of personal judgments about prettiness, which is 
otherwise payoff-irrelevant; and in Graham’s case to the psychology of a representative 
uninformed investor’s reaction to news. Equilibrium is not very helpful in anticipating others’ 
responses in such settings. Instead the quotations explicitly suggest thought processes in which 
players anchor beliefs in a model of others’ instinctive reactions and then iterate best responses a 
finite number of times, processes whose heterogeneity and finiteness closely resemble a level-k 
                                                 
20 Graham, who originally became famous as the co-author of Graham and David Dodd (1934), may now be even better known 
as Warren Buffett’s intellectual hero.   18 
or cognitive hierarchy model. Keynes’ “fourth, fifth and higher degrees” is somewhat more than 
the evidence we shall present suggests is realistic, but may be only a coy reference to himself. 
  As we shall illustrate, the level-k/CH features of the Keynes and Graham quotations are 
representative of folk game theory: One can also find quotations reflecting one or two steps of 
iterated (strict or weak) dominance in the normal form or of iterated (weak) dominance reflecting 
forward or backward induction in the extensive form. But it is difficult to find quotations 
involving more than one or two iterations, and at least as difficult to find quotations that illustrate 
the fixed-point reasoning that underlies equilibrium in games without dominance.
21
  There is now a large body of experimental research that studies strategic thinking by eliciting 
initial responses to games with a variety of structures. The most important studies whose designs  
use normal-form complete-information games with neutral framing include those of Stahl and 
Wilson (1994, 1995); Nagel (1995); Ho, Camerer, and Keith Weigelt (1998); Costa-Gomes, 
Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Antoni Bosch-Domènech et al. (2002); Camerer, Ho, and Chong 
(2004); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006); and Costa-Gomes and Georg Weizäsacker (2008).  
 
  In this section we first discuss Nagel’s (1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s (1998); and 
Bosch-Domènech et al.’s (2002) analyses of n-person guessing games that were directly inspired 
by Keynes’ beauty contest analogy. We next discuss Stahl and Wilson’s (1994, 1995) and Costa-
Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s (2001) analyses of two-person matrix games. Finally, we 
discuss Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) analysis of two-person guessing games. In the 
process we highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each design, and the lessons from each set 
of results for modeling strategic thinking.
22
                                                 
21 Tellingly, Jacob Marschak (1946), in one of the first reviews of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), quotes the 
Keynes passage above and says (with reference to their theory of zero-sum two-person games) “…it seems to us that properly 
stated differences in degrees of knowledge or intelligence of individual players can also be regarded as rules of the game.”    
 We give the most emphasis to Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford’s (2006) analysis because its design is the most powerful and comes closest to letting 
the data reveal subjects’ strategic thinking directly, without an econometric “middleman”. Its 
conclusions are consistent with and representative of the conclusions of most other carefully 
done studies of initial responses to normal-form games with neutral framing, just more precise. 
22 In normal-form games with neutral framing it is natural in a level-k or cognitive hierarchy analysis to take L0 as uniform 
random over the entire strategy space, as explained below. In Sections 5 and 9-13 we discuss experiments on normal-form 
games with incomplete information or non-neutral framing and experiments and thought-experiments on extensive-form 
games with preplay communication, in which different specifications of L0 are natural as we shall explain.      19 
3.1. Beauty Contest Games 
In Nagel’s (1995) and Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s (1998) games, n subjects (n = 15-18 in 
Nagel, n = 3 or 7 in Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt) made simultaneous guesses between lower and 
upper limits (0 and 100 in Nagel, 0 and 100 or 100 and 200 in HCW). In Bosch-Domènech et al. 
(2002) essentially the same games were played in the field, by more than 7500 volunteers 
recruited from subscribers of the newspapers Financial Times, Spektrum der Wissenchaft, or 
Expansión. In each case the subject who guessed closest to a target (p = 1/2, 2/3, or 4/3 in Nagel; 
p = 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, or 1.3 in Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt; and p = 2/3 in Bosch-Domènech et al.) 
times the group average guess won a prize. There were several treatments, each with identical 
targets and limits for all players and games. The structures were publicly announced, to justify 
comparing the results with predictions based on complete information. 
  Although Nagel’s and Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s subjects played a game repeatedly, their 
first-round guesses can be viewed as initial responses if they treated their own influences on 
future guesses as negligible, which is plausible for all but Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s three-
subject groups. Bosch-Domènech et al.’s subjects played only once. 
  With complete information, in all but one treatment the game is dominance-solvable in a 
finite (limits 100 and 200) or infinite (limits 0 and 100) number of rounds, with a unique 
equilibrium in which all players guess their lower (upper) limit when p < 1 (p > 1). The 
rationality-based argument for this “all–0” equilibrium is stronger than many equilibrium 
arguments, because it depends only on iterated (though sometimes infinitely iterated) knowledge 
of rationality, not on the assumption that players have mutual knowledge of beliefs. 
The results of these experiments vividly illustrate the failure of equilibrium as a descriptive 
model of initial responses, and the heterogeneity and discreteness of strategic thinking. Nagel’s 
subjects never made equilibrium guesses initially; Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s rarely did so, and 
Bosch-Domènech et al.’s (who had much more time to reflect, and who could consult with 
others) fairly rarely did so. In each case most subjects’ initial guesses respected from 0 to 3 
rounds of iterated dominance, in games where 3 to an infinite number are needed to reach 
equilibrium. Here we reproduce Bosch-Domènech et al.’s Figure 1, which illustrates these points 
most clearly; see also Nagel’s Figure 1 and Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s Figures 2A-H and 3A-B.   20 
 
Figure 1. Bosch-Domènech et al.’s (2002) Figure 1 
   
These data resemble neither “equilibrium plus noise” nor “equilibrium taking noise into 
account” as in QRE. They do suggest that subjects’ deviations from equilibrium have a coherent 
structure. In each case the distributions of guesses have spikes that track 50p
k for k = 1, 2, 3 
across the different targets p in the various treatments. Like the spectrograph peaks that 
foreshadow the existence of chemical elements, these spikes are evidence of a partly 
deterministic structure, one that is discrete and individually heterogeneous.
23
                                                 
23 Yves Breitmoser (2010) shows that when individual players’ influences are non-negligible, the tournament incentives of 
Nagel’s design invalidate the usual characterization of Lk guesses. Behaviorally, this makes little difference because the usual 
characterization builds in heuristics most people seem to use in all but the smallest groups. In a richly parameterized 
econometric analysis, Breitmoser also obtains results that differ from the interpretation in the text for some subject groups. In 
reading the evidence, we place heavier weight on data generated by the more powerful designs discussed in Sections 3.2-4. 
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These designs are distinguished by their large strategy spaces, which greatly increase the 
informativeness of their results. But from the point of view of studying strategic thinking via 
initial responses—which was not these experimenters’ sole purpose—they have a weakness in 
that each subject played only one game, so there was in effect only one observation per subject 
(although there was some between-subjects variation across the games used in different 
treatments). Even with very large strategy spaces, one observation yields limited information, 
and so the results leave considerable ambiguity of interpretation regarding subjects’ types. 
  To take the most important example of this ambiguity, the spikes’ locations and how they 
vary across treatments in these games have two plausible interpretations, which differ in some 
important applications. In one, subjects follow “level-k” rules based on an L0 that is assumed to 
be uniformly random over the strategy space. Recalling that L0 represents players’ model of 
others’ instinctive reactions to the game before they start thinking about others’ incentives, it 
seems natural to take L0 as derived from either ignoring strategic considerations and invoking 
the principle of insufficient reason, or randomly sampling the payoffs, and this is the emerging 
consensus for normal-form games with neutral framing.
24
    In many other games, with or without a uniform random L0 as long as it has full support, Dk 
and Lk+1 respond similarly to dominance, both yielding k-rationalizable strategies (the different 
indices are only a quirk of notation). But Dk and Lk+1 are separated, although weakly, in Stahl 
and Wilson’s (1995), Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s (1998), and Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and 
Broseta’s (2001) experiments; and they are strongly separated in Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s 
(2006) experiments. The stronger the separation, the more the results favor Lk over Dk types. 
 Lk then iterates best responses k times, 
so that in these games Lk+1 guesses [(0+100)/2]p
k+1. In another interpretation, subjects follow 
rules like Dk, which does k rounds of iterated dominance for some small number, k = 1 or 2, and 
then best responds to a uniform prior over its partner’s remaining strategies (thus “completing” 
k-rationalizability via a natural specific selection), so that Dk also guesses ([0+100p
k]/2)p. As a 
result, theorists often interpret the results from these experiments as showing that subjects 
explicitly performed iterated dominance, though these results don’t show that. 
                                                                                                                                                             
We believe that more powerful and more comprehensive designs are a more likely route to further progress than progressively 
more sophisticated econometric analyses of existing datasets, especially those with only one observation per subject.    
24 In this paper we focus mainly on two-person games, but in n-person games it matters whether L0 is independent across players 
or correlated, and the limited evidence (Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt 1998, Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Iriberri 2009) suggests 
that most people have highly correlated models of others. For the moment we simply take L0 to model all others’ average 
guess, implicitly assuming perfect correlation as the evidence approximately suggests. We return to this issue in Section 6.   22 
  Nagel’s (1995), Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s (1998), and Bosch-Domènech et al.’s (2002) 
designs have another weakness for our purposes, in that their subject groups were so large that 
subjects very likely treated their own influences, except on their own payoffs, as negligible, and 
assumed that other subjects would do so as well.
25
3.2. Other Normal-Form Games  
 Although subjects’ interactions were still far 
from trivial from a game-theoretic point of view, such large-group results give limited insight 
into behavior in the many settings where players must choose their strategies while anticipating 
the responses of other players who do not think any one player’s influence is negligible. To put it 
more concretely, when we (the authors) think about the stock market, we know that “it” isn’t 
thinking about us, and this fact greatly simplifies our thinking about how the market will react to 
news. But when Warren Buffet thinks about the market, he knows that the market is also 
thinking about him, and this makes his thinking more fully strategic than ours is. In the rest of 
the experiments we discuss, individual players’ influences are non-negligible. 
  Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) report the results of experiments in which each subject played 
a series of 10 or 12 different but related 3×3 matrix games, an important advance on the common 
previous practice of trying to infer subjects’ strategic thinking from their responses to a single 
game. As in all the remaining experiments discussed in this section, their subjects were randomly 
and anonymously paired to play the games, with no feedback, with the goal of suppressing 
learning and repeated-game effects in order to elicit subjects’ initial responses, game by game, 
studying strategic thinking “uncontaminated” by learning. Stahl and Wilson’s designs increase 
the number of observations per subject relative to Nagel’s; Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s; and 
Bosch-Domènech et al.’s; but they coarsen the strategy space by allowing only three decisions. 
  Stahl and Wilson’s data analyses contained a uniform random L0, an L1 as defined in Section 
2.4, and an L2 which differs from Section 2.4’s in that it best responds to a noisy L1 (which Stahl 
and Wilson motivate as a proxy for a weighted averaged of their uniform random L0s and L1s), 
much as Section 2.3’s QRE players best respond to the predicted noise in others’ decisions. Stahl 
and Wilson (1995) considered several types in addition to the level-k hierarchy. These include 
Rational Expectations, which best responds to the predicted choice frequencies among potential 
partners, a variant of the type Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) and Costa-Gomes and 
                                                 
25 This excludes Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s 3-subject groups. In experimental game theory, the smallest “large” number may be 
as low as 4, and is certainly not higher than 10.    23 
Crawford (2006) call Sophisticated; Worldly, which best responds to an estimated mixture of a 
noisy L1 and a noiseless Equilibrium; and Naïve Nash, which makes equilibrium decisions, 
possibly with noise. Stahl and Wilson found no evidence of Rational Expectations subjects, but 
there were 38 of 48 subjects for which one type had (in their Bayesian analysis) posterior 
probability at least 0.90: 17 Worldly, 9 L1, 6 L0, 5 Naïve Nash, and 1 L2.
26 Stahl and Wilson 
(1994) conducted a similar analysis of data generated by a design closely related to that of Stahl 
and Wilson (1995), allowing types L0, L1, their variant of L2, and Naïve Nash (but not Worldly, 
Optimistic, or Pessimistic). They found 35 of 40 subjects for which one type has posterior 
probability at least 0.90: 18 L2, 9 Naïve Nash, and 8 L1.
27
  Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) report experiments in which each subject 
played a series of 18 different but related 2×2, 2×3, and 2×4 matrix games, further increasing the 
number of observations per subject above Stahl and Wilson’s (1994, 1995) numbers, but 
continuing with their coarse strategy spaces. Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s results also 
show very clearly that subjects usually make undominated decisions. However, their subjects 
respect iterated dominance progressively less often, the more rounds of dominance are required 
to identify equilibrium decisions, to the point where beyond two or three rounds, equilibrium 
compliance is no better than random. 
 
  Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s data analysis allows types L1, L2, and L3 as defined 
in Section 2.4 (best responding to noiseless lower-level types); D1 and D2 as defined in Section 
3.1; an Equilibrium type like Stahl and Wilson’s Naïve Nash; and a Sophisticated type that best 
responds to the observed choice frequencies among potential partners, as a proxy for subjects 
whose understanding of strategic behavior transcends mechanical rules such as the other types. 
  Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s estimates of the type distribution are quite similar to 
Stahl and Wilson’s, with one exception: They exclude Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) Worldly type a 
priori—on the grounds that it depends on estimated parameters and/or others' decision noise, and 
                                                 
26 Following an early version of Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), who also looked for decision theoretic types called 
Optimistic (maximax) and Pessimistic (maximin), Ernan Haruvy, Stahl, and Wilson (1999) modified Stahl and Wilson’s 
(1995) design in an attempt to identify Optimistic and Pessimistic subjects. Like Costa-Gomes et al. they found no Pessimistic 
but some Optimistic subjects, of whom most would have been estimated as Worldly in Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) analysis. 
27 Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer (2009) conduct a horse race between CH and LQRE in Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) games, finding 
no important differences in fit.   24 
thus implicitly assumes that subjects have prior understandings of others' responses—and as a 
result they identify many subjects as L2 and some as D1.
28
  Although Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) data analysis from a closely related experiment almost 
completely rejected L2 in favor of their heavily parameterized Worldly type, in an econometric 
analysis that did not include Worldly, Stahl and Wilson (1994) found large numbers of L1 and L2 
subjects, with results much closer to Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s than to Stahl and 
Wilson’s (1995) results, despite the similarities of the two Stahl and Wilson designs. 
 
  This instability of estimates reflects a common trade-off in the literature: To the extent that 
designs lack sufficient power to let the data speak for themselves (because of coarse strategy 
spaces or for other reasons), the data analysis rests heavily on small-sample econometrics with 
significant risk of specification bias and correspondingly fragile estimates. There is, therefore, a 
premium on designs powerful enough to let the data speak for themselves, with less reliance on 
econometrics, such as Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) design discussed next, which 
suggests that Stahl and Wilson’s rejection of L2 in favor of Worldly was incorrect. 
3.3. Two-Person Guessing Games 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) design combines the large strategy spaces of Nagel’s 
(1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s (1998); and Bosch-Domènech et al.’s (2002) designs with 
the important strengthening feature of Stahl and Wilson’s (1994, 1995) and Costa-Gomes, 
Crawford, and Broseta’s  (2001) designs that each subject played a series of different but related 
games, in this case 16. Again subjects were randomly and anonymously paired to play the 
games, with no feedback, with the goal of suppressing learning and repeated-game effects. 
(“Eureka!” learning was possible, but it was tested for and found to be rare.) The combination of 
large strategy spaces with each subject playing a series of games greatly enhances the design’s 
power, and the profile of a subject’s guesses in the 16 games forms a “fingerprint” that helps to 
identify his strategic thinking more precisely than is possible by observing his responses to a 
series of games with small strategy spaces or a single game with a large strategy space.
29
                                                 
28 Matthias Sutter, Simon Czermak, and Francisco Feri (2010) replicate Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s (2001) design 
and results for individuals and also for three-person teams, finding teams somewhat more sophisticated than individuals.    
  
29 Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) designs also studied subjects’ 
strategic thinking by monitoring their searches for hidden but freely accessible payoff information. Their data analyses rested 
on a simple theory of how cognition drives search as well as decisions, which implies that different types’ search implications 
are separated, including Dk and Lk+1. The analyses of search confirmed the results of their analyses of decisions, including 
that the results favor Lk over Dk types (Crawford 2008 and Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2011). See also Chun-Ting Chen, 
Chen-Ying Huang, and Wang (2009), who add an interesting spatial dimension to the analysis of search.   25 
In Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s guessing games, each player has his own lower and upper 
limit, both strictly positive, which implies that the games are finitely dominance-solvable. Each 
player also has his own target, and his payoff increases with the closeness of his guess to his 
target times the other’s guess. The targets and limits vary independently across players and 
games, with targets both less than one, both greater than one, or “mixed”.
30
These guessing games have essentially unique equilibria, determined (not always directly) 
by players’ lower (upper) limits when the product of targets is less (greater) than one. The 
discontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence when the product of targets equals one stress-
tests equilibrium, which responds much more strongly to the product of the targets than 
alternative decision rules do; and enhances the separation of equilibrium from alternative rules.  
  
Consider a game in which players’ targets are 0.7 and 1.5, the first player’s limits are [300, 
500], and the second’s are [100, 900]. The product of targets is 1.05 > 1, and it can be shown that 
the equilibrium is therefore determined by players’ upper limits. (When the product of targets is 
< 1, the equilibrium is similarly determined by their lower limits.) In equilibrium the first player 
guesses his upper limit 500, but the second player guesses 750 (= 500 × his target 1.5), below his 
upper limit 900. No guess is dominated for the first player, but any guess outside [450, 750] is 
dominated for the second player. Given this, any guess outside [315, 500] is iteratively 
dominated for the first player; any guess outside [472.5, 750] is then dominated for the second; 
and so on until the equilibrium at (500, 750) is reached after 22 rounds of iterated dominance. 
The main difficulty in analyzing the data from such experiments is identifying subjects' 
decision rules, or types, within the enormous set of possibilities. As in previous studies, Costa-
Gomes and Crawford assumed that each subject’s decisions follow one of a small set of a priori 
plausible types, up to logit errors, and econometrically estimate which type best fit his decisions.  
The types allowed include behaviorally plausible types whose relevance was suggested by 
previous work: L1, L2, and L3 as defined in Section 2.4; D1 and D2 as defined in Section 3.1; 
Equilibrium, which makes its equilibrium decision; and Sophisticated, which best responds to the 
distribution of other subjects’ responses, and is included to test whether any subject has a prior 
understanding of others’ decisions that transcends the other simple rules. The restriction to this 
list was tested, and found to be a reasonable approximation to the support of subjects’ types. 
                                                 
30 In Nagel’s (1995) and Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt’s (1998) guessing experiments, by contrast, the targets and limits were 
always the same for both players, and they varied at most across treatments with different subject groups.   26 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s large strategy spaces and the independent variation of targets and 
limits across games greatly enhance the separation of types’ implications, to the point where 
many subjects’ types can be precisely identified from their guessing “fingerprints”. 
   Of the 88 subjects in Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s main treatments, 43 made guesses that 
complied exactly (within 0.5) with one type’s guesses in from 7 to 16 of the games (20 L1, 12 
L2, 3 L3, and 8 Equilibrium). Because their types specify precise, well-separated guess 
sequences in a very large space, with 200 to 800 possible exact guesses in each of 16 different 
games, these subjects’ guesses allow one intuitively to “accept” the hypothesis that they 
followed their apparent types, and so rule out alternative interpretations of their behavior.
31
  In particular, because the accepted Lk and Equilibrium types build in risk-neutral, self-
interested rationality and perfect models of the game, the deviations from equilibrium of the 35 
subjects whose apparent types are Lk can be confidently attributed to nonequilibrium beliefs 
rather than irrationality, risk aversion, altruism, spite, or confusion. Thus, the level-k model is 
directly suggested by these subjects’ data, rather than simply suggested by data-fitting exercises 
that impose strong structural assumptions. By contrast, in designs with coarse strategy spaces 
even a perfect fit does not distinguish a subject’s apparent type from nearby omitted types. In 
designs in which each subject plays a single game, the ambiguity is even more severe, so that 
even in Nagel’s large strategy spaces, rules as cognitively disparate as Dk and Lk+1 yield 
identical decisions. Identification of types then necessarily rests on structural assumptions. 
 
  Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s other 45 subjects made guesses that conformed less closely to 
a type, making structural econometrics necessary. But for all but 14 subjects, violations of simple 
dominance were fairly rare (less than 20%, versus 38% for random guesses), suggesting that 
their behavior was coherent, even if less well described by a type. Econometric type estimates 
are concentrated on L1, L2, L3, and Equilibrium, in roughly the same proportions as for subjects 
with high rates of exact compliance. 
  In particular, unrestricted estimates of the frequency of L0 subjects, given the econometric 
model’s clear separation of L0 and the error structure, yield a frequency of zero, suggesting that 
L0s exist only in the minds of other subjects, as L1’s model of others, L2’s model of L1’s model 
of others, and so on. Low frequencies of L0 are an important sign of health for a level-k model, 
                                                 
31 We stress that Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s Baseline subjects were taught only how to compute their payoffs and then quizzed 
on identifying their and their partner's best-responses, but not taught any particular decision rule. Their high rates of exact 
compliance with level-k types reflect their own thinking.    27 
in that high frequencies would reduce the model to a parameterized distribution of responses, 
thus describing the data rather than explaining it. Only when the strategic iteration of best 
responses plays a role can the model yield a useful explanation of the data. 
  The econometric analysis also suggests that there are few if any Sophisticated subjects. The 
strong separation of Dk from Lk+1 allows the analysis to show convincingly that there are few if 
any Dk subjects: To the extent that subjects respect finitely iterated dominance, it is not because 
they explicitly perform it but because they follow level-k rules that respect it—a distinction that 
matters in many games, if not in Nagel’s (1995) games where Dk is not separated from Lk+1.
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For those 45 subjects, there is some room for doubt about whether Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford’s specification omits relevant types and/or overfits by including irrelevant types. The 
freedom to specify the possible types also raises doubts about omitted types and overfitting via 
accidental correlations with included but irrelevant types. Might the high estimated numbers of 
L1 and L2 subjects might be no more than proxies for altruistic, spiteful, risk-averse, or confused 
Dk or Equilibrium subjects; or other, entirely different omitted types? To test for this, Costa-
Gomes and Crawford conducted a specification test, which reaffirms most of their identifications 
of L1, L2, L3, or Equilibrium subjects and supports their specification by giving no indication of 
significant numbers of Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) Worldly type or any other omitted type. 
  
3.4. Eliciting Beliefs 
  Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker’s (2008) study asks experimental subjects to choose 
actions and state beliefs about their partners’ actions in 14 two-person 3×3 games, with beliefs 
elicited via a quadratic scoring rule, which is incentive compatible under the assumption that the 
decision-maker is a risk-neutral expected-utility maximizer. Eliciting beliefs can provide finer 
information about strategic thinking than eliciting actions, and beliefs are an informative 
supplement to actions in any case. Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker’s design strongly separates 
both the actions and the beliefs implied by the leading strategic decision rules L1, L2, LQRE, NI, 
and Equilibrium. In their analysis of their aggregate data, they find that although subjects’ 
actions are best described by L1, their stated beliefs are closer to L2’s beliefs. The results suggest 
                                                 
32 This last conclusion is reinforced by Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2011) (see also Crawford 2008) analysis of subjects’ 
searches for hidden payoff information and by their data on “robot/trained subjects,” where 7 of 19 subjects, who were trained 
and rewarded to follow type D1 and passed an understanding test in which L2 answers were incorrect, then “morphed” into L2 
(D1’s closest Lk relative) in the guesses for which they were paid. Aside from the one of 19 robot/trained D2 subjects who 
morphed into L3, this was the only kind of morphing that occurred. Although by standard measures Dk’s cognitive 
requirements are close to Lk+1’s, and these treatments also show that most subjects were capable of learning to follow Dk, the 
morphing suggests that subjects find iterated dominance far less natural than the iterated best responses that underlie Lk rules.   28 
that despite subjects’ incentives, they viewed choosing actions and stating separately 
incentivized beliefs as largely unrelated tasks, rather than requiring actions to be best responses 
to beliefs as decision theory suggests; on average, their actions and beliefs are consistent in this 
sense 50% to 60% of the time. This in turn suggests that decision rules may be more fundamental 
for most subjects than beliefs. Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker close by noting that stated beliefs 
are subject to error just as actions are, suggesting caution in imposing the restriction that actions 
have to be best responses to stated beliefs.
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3.5. Level-k and CH Models versus Equilibrium plus Noise, Finitely Iterated Dominance and k-
Rationalizability, LQRE, and NI Models 
 
We now summarize how the experimental evidence relates to the models of strategic 
thinking discussed in Section 2.   
Nagel’s (1995), Ho, Camerer and Weigelt’s (1998), and Bosch-Domènech et al.’s (2002) 
results make it clear that subjects initial responses can deviate systematically from equilibrium, 
even in games where equilibrium reasoning requires “only” indefinitely iterated dominance, 
resembling neither equilibrium plus noise nor QRE for any reasonable distribution. They also 
show that strategic thinking is heterogeneous and falls into discrete classes (with errors), so that 
no model that imposes homogeneity, as equilibrium plus noise, QRE, and NI do, will do full 
justice to subjects’ behavior.
34
  Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) 
results suggest that overall, a level-k model with a uniform random L0 and L1, L2, L3, and 
possibly Equilibrium subjects explains a large fraction of subjects’ deviations from equilibrium 
in normal-form games with neutral framing. Their conclusions are consistent with those of most 
other carefully done studies of initial responses to normal-form games with neutral framing, just 
more precise. Their results also suggest that the type distribution is fairly stable across settings, 
with most weight on L1, L2, and perhaps L3. Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) specification 
test suggests that these types and possibly Equilibrium are all relevant, but that at least in this 
 Finally, although strategic thinking respects iterated dominance to 
some extent, this is limited to a few rounds, so rationalizability (as opposed to k–rationalizability 
for low k) is too strong. Stahl and Wilson’s (1994, 1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta’s 
(2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) results confirm these lessons. 
                                                 
33 Pedro Rey-Biel (2009) partially replicates Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker’s (2008) results, showing that in constant-sum games, 
where equilibrium reasoning need not depend on strategic thinking, equilibrium outperforms level-k and other rules. 
34 Allowing heterogeneity is essential to explain the patterns of nonequilibrium behavior discussed in Sections 6, 9, and 11.   29 
setting other deviations from equilibrium have little or no discernable structure and describe only 
about 1-2% of their subject population. Thus, although about half of subjects’ deviations from 
equilibrium remain unexplained by the proposed level-k plus Equilibrium model, it may still be 
optimal to treat the remaining unexplained deviations as errors; and the part of the structure that 
can be identified can provide a sound basis for unbiased modeling of initial responses to games. 
  Given these conclusions, might not other models, such as equilibrium plus noise, finitely 
iterated strict dominance and k-rationalizability, LQRE, CH, or NI, do as well or even better?  
  Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) econometric analysis nests equilibrium plus noise via 
their Equilibrium type with logit errors. Only 11 of the 88 subjects in their main treatments are 
estimated to be Equilibrium subjects, and there is clear evidence that even those subjects are 
following rules that only mimic Equilibrium, and that only in some games (pp. 1753-1754). For 
their remaining 77 subjects, equilibrium plus logit noise misses clear patterns in the data. 
Further, these subjects’ “errors” neither center on 0 nor usually exhibit the sensitivity to 
deviation costs assumed in a logit specification. We believe this is because the errors are 
cognitive or structural, reflecting misspecification rather than a trade-off between effort cost and 
accuracy. Instead these subjects’ errors have a clear deterministic structure, which is better 
described by the level-k model that emerges from Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s estimates. 
  Because all of the types with significant estimated frequencies respect k–rationalizability for 
at least k = 1, except for the heterogeneity noted above there is no conflict with finitely iterated 
strict dominance and k-rationalizability, only more specific predictions that imply progressively 
lower and lower compliance frequencies as k rises above 1. 
  Turning to LQRE and NI, the large strategy spaces and independent variation of targets and 
limits across games and players of Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s guessing games yields stronger 
separation of level-k types from LQRE and NI than is possible in simpler designs with unvarying 
games and smaller strategy spaces. At the same time, Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (footnote 34, 
p. 1763) “median voter” result, which stems from the piecewise linearity and symmetry of their 
payoff function and shows that in their games, a risk-neutral player’s best response is completely 
determined by the median of the distribution of his partner’s response, would make equilibrium 
plus logit noise coincide with LQRE except for small payoff asymmetries due to automatic   30 
adjustment to the limits.
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  Given that NI is a flexible parameterization that includes LQRE as a special case, it may well 
fit better than LQRE. Recall that in an NI model, players form beliefs by iterating best responses, 
with higher-order beliefs reflecting increasing amounts of noise. In Goeree and Holt’s (2004) 
favored specification, in which the noisiness of higher-order beliefs grows geometrically, the 
highest-order relevant beliefs are uniform random, which we take to mean within the limits in 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s games. Even assuming logit errors and geometric growth, because 
the NI decision is a continuous function of the noise level and its rate of growth, varying those 
parameters yields a wide range of possible decisions. As a result, unlike equilibrium plus logit 
noise, LQRE, level-k, or CH models, NI models seem overparameterized for applications to a 
single game, and they probably risk overfitting even in datasets that span multiple games.  
 Thus, the rejection of Equilibrium in favor of level-k types for 77 of 
the 88 subjects in Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s main treatments strongly suggests that LQRE 
would be similarly rejected. This is unsurprising, because as noted above in connection with 
Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) Worldly type, Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006, Section II.D) 
results cast doubt on LQRE’s assumption that players respond to a nondegenerate probability 
distribution of others’ responses. 
  As these comparisons illustrate, that the level-k model is directly grounded in evidence, 
rather than ambiguously suggested by data-fitting exercises that impose strong structural 
assumptions, is an important advantage over alternatives like LQRE and NI. 
Turning finally to level-k versus CH models, by a quirk of Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s 
(2006, fn. 36, p. 1763) design, level-k types’ decisions are not separated from their CH 
counterparts’ decisions: Level-k and CH L1s are identical by definition, and the median voter 
result mentioned above, for empirically plausible type distributions like those Camerer, Ho, and 
Chong (2004) estimate, a CH L2 and L3 are both identical in these games to a level-k L2. 
However, to fit the data the CH model’s Poisson parameter τ (the average k) must be 
approximately 1.5, which constrains the frequency of its L0 to 0.22. Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford’s and many other unconstrained estimates almost all assign L0 a far lower frequency, 
usually zero (and this, we have argued, is a sign of health). Thus the Poisson constraint will often 
                                                 
35 To see why LQRE is nonetheless separated from equilibrium plus logit noise, consider a guessing game in which players’ 
targets are 0.7 and 1.5, the first player’s limits are [300, 500], and the second’s are [100, 900], in which the equilibrium, (500, 
750), is reached after 22 rounds of iterated dominance. Because the first player’s equilibrium guess is at her lower [upper] 
limit, the second players’ deviations below/above 750 are less/more costly, so that LQRE players will play strategies below 
750 with somewhat higher probability than strategies above 750.   31 
be strongly binding, and with comparable error structures (though possibly not with the structure 
often assumed in applications of CH models, in which a uniform random L0 doubles as the error 
structure for higher types), a level-k model will have an advantage in fit over a CH model.
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3.6 Directions for Future Work 
 
The experimental work reviewed here has considered several different kinds of games, with 
an encouraging trend toward more powerful experimental designs and correspondingly less 
reliance on econometrics. It has yielded an increasingly clear message about the kinds of model 
that best describe strategic thinking, which we shall show in later sections extends to even more 
kinds of games. However, to date almost all of the evidence has been generated within classes of 
games studied in isolation; and some of the inferences have been based on econometric horse 
races rather than decisive experimental tests. For the models that emerge to be worthy 
competitors to equilibrium, they should give an account of strategic thinking as precise as 
possible, with the capability of tracking behavior across games with the variety of structures 
encountered in applications (though possibly avoiding games that are unrepresentative of 
realistic situations). It should be possible, via new designs, to combine this structural variety with 
the power of some of the designs that have focused on single classes of games. We believe that 
such experimental work will lead to improved specifications of level-k/CH and hybrid models 
that are portable enough to describe behavior accurately across a wide range of applications.    
In one example of work that begins to assess portability, Sotiris Georganas, Paul J. Healy, 
and Roberto A. Weber (2010) report experiments that rerun some of Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford’s (2006) guessing games and some new “undercutting” games (similar to Traveler’s 
Dilemma games).
37
                                                 
36 Further, Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006) data on subjects’ searches for hidden but freely accessible payoff information are 
much more consistent with the search implications of the level-k model than with those of a CH model, which blurs the 
implications of some important types (Crawford 2008). 
 They find further support for level-k/CH models within games, and some 
positive correlation of subjects’ types with cognitive ability measures; but only moderate 
correlation of estimated types across games within subjects, with some crossovers in the ordering 
of subjects by type across different games. We suspect the weak correlation is due in part to 
Georganas, Healy, and Weber’s simplification of Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s instructions 
regarding the structure of the games and their omission of the understanding test in which 
subjects were required to demonstrate understanding of how their payoffs would be determined 
37 See also Ayala Arad and Rubinstein (2010), who study portability in a variety of treatments with similar games.   32 
to continue. We believe that such understanding is crucial for results that are representative of 
the field, where most people seem to understand very well how their payoffs are determined. 
In another such example, Konrad B. Burchardi and Stefan P. Penczynski (2010) study one of 
Nagel’s (1995) beauty contest games and Rubinstein and Tversky’s hide-and-seek game with 
non-neutral framing of locations (Rubinstein 1999), as also studied by Crawford and Iriberri 
(2007b) (Section 9) and Penczynski (2010). Burchardi and Penczynski adapt David J. Cooper 
and John H. Kagel’s (2005) method for studying cognition by having decisions made by two-
subject teams with common payoffs, whose chat deliberations were monitored along with their 
decisions. If the two could agree on a decision, it was implemented; if not each subject submitted 
a final proposed decision, which was implemented with probability one-half. The results for 
decisions and chats both yield further support for level-k/CH models. Judging from the chats, 
more than half of the subjects started their reasoning processes with an L0 anchoring type, which 
sometimes coincided with the standard uniform random specification of L0. Most subjects also 
followed iterated best response reasoning, to the exclusion of iterated dominance. But Burchardi 
and Penczynski also find that subjects’ apparent types are only weakly correlated within subjects 
across beauty contest and hide-and-seek games with non-neutral framing of locations.  
In their econometric specification, Burchardi and Penczynski postulate a heterogeneous L0 
with bounded normal errors, and in the style of CH models they allow no errors in higher types’ 
decisions beyond those implied by best responses to this L0, but without assuming that the type 
distribution is Poisson. Even so, they estimate the frequency of L0 to be 22-37%, far more than 
other estimates with an unconstrained type distribution we are aware of. This result could be due 
to the dual role of L0 in their model, as the anchor for higher types and as the error structure. 
 
4. M.M. Kaye’s Far Pavilions: 
Responding to Payoff Asymmetries in Outguessing Games 
 
“…ride hard for the north, since they will be sure you will go southward where the 
climate is kinder….” 
 
—M.M. Kaye’s The Far Pavilions (1978, p. 97) 
 
Early in M.M. Kaye’s novel The Far Pavilions, the main male character, Ash/Ashok, is 
trying to escape from his pursuers along a north-south road. Both Ash and his pursuers must   33 
choose between north and south. Although Ash moves first, the pursuers must make their choice 
irrevocably before they learn Ash’s choice, so their choices are strategically simultaneous. South 
is warm, but north are the Himalayas, with winter coming. Ash’s mentor, Koda Dad, nonetheless 
advises Ash to ride north as in the quotation above. Ash overcomes his fear of freezing and 
follows Koda Dad’s advice, the pursuers unimaginatively go south, and Ash escapes. 
Examples like this are as common in experimental game theory as they are in fiction. But 
fiction sometimes more clearly reveals the thinking behind a decision. Here, Koda Dad is 
advising Ash to choose the L3 response to a uniform random L0.
38
 
 To see this, imagine that if 
the pursuers catch Ash, they gain two units of payoff and Ash loses two; and that they both gain 
one extra unit for choosing south, whether or not Ash is caught. This yields the payoff matrix: 
    Pursuers 
    South (q)  North 
Ash 








    Figure 2. Far Pavilions Escape 
   
If the pursuers expect Ash to go south because it’s “kinder”, they must be modeling Ash as 
an L1 response to a uniform random L0. For, the unspecified payoff asymmetry on which this 
inference rests is necessarily decisive only if north and south do not differ in the probability of 
being caught. Thus, Koda Dad must be modeling the pursuers as L2 and advising Ash to choose 
the L3 response to a uniform random L0. 
Importantly, although the level-k model takes the inference that pursuers will expect Ash to 
go south literally as a best response to a uniform random L0, there is a behaviorally more 
plausible interpretation in which the inference is a model of pursuers’ model of Ash ignoring his 
strategic considerations, and given this, based on the principle of insufficient reason. Further, in 
a more complex game a uniform random L0 plausibly approximates random sampling of payoffs 
unstratified by the other players’ strategy choices. 
                                                 
38 In the HBO miniseries, Koda Dad was played by Omar Sharif. For all of Sharif’s success at bridge, his character’s advice may 
be his most enduring contribution to game theory. L3 ties our personal best k for a clearly explained level-k type in fiction or 
non-game-theoretic nonfiction. We suspect that even postmodern fiction may have no clear Lks higher than L3, because they 
wouldn’t be credible. We also doubt that one can find examples (clear or not) of fixed-point reasoning.   34 
How does the level-k model compare in predictive success with an equilibrium model? Far 
Pavilions Escape has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which Ash’s Pr{South} p* = 
1/4, and the Pursuers’ Pr{South} q* = 3/4. Thus in equilibrium the novel’s observed outcome 
{Ash North, Pursuers South} has probability (1 – p*)q* = 9/16: much better than a random 25%. 
By contrast, the level-k model implies decisions as in Table 1. Thus the level-k model exactly 
predicts the outcome provided that Ash is either L2 or (as we know is true from the quoted 
rationale) L3, and the Pursuers are either L1 or (as Koda Dad believes) L2.  
This comparison is unfair because applications seldom come with an omniscient narrator 
telling us how players are thinking, and equilibrium does not use such information. If we deny 
such information to the level-k model as well, we can still derive the model’s implications and, 
with enough data, find the population type frequency distribution that fits best, as illustrated in 
Sections 5 and 9. Alternatively, we can calibrate the level-k model using previous estimates from 
similar settings, as illustrated in Sections 9 and 10. 
 
 Type  Ash  Pursuers 
L0  Uniform random  Uniform random 
L1  South  South 
L2  North  South 
L3  North  North 
L4  South  North 
L5  South  South 
Table 1. Lk types’ decisions in Far Pavilions Escape 
 
Suppose, for example, that we assume that each player role is filled from a 50-30-20 mixture 
of L1s, L2s, and L3s and there are no errors.
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More importantly, the level-k model explains a puzzling divergence between observed 
aggregate behavior and equilibrium predictions. In games like Far Pavilions Escape and 
perturbed Matching Pennies, the mixed-strategy equilibrium responds to the payoff asymmetry 
between south and north in a decision-theoretically intuitive way for the pursuers’ role (q* = 3/4 
 Then the predicted frequencies with which Ash 
goes north and the pursuers go south are 1/2 and 4/5 respectively. Assuming independence, this 
implies that the observed outcome {Ash North, Pursuers South} has probability 2/5: less than the 
equilibrium predicted frequency of 9/16, but noticeably better than a random 25%.  
                                                 
39 This violates the unwritten laws of fiction, where protagonists are almost always more sophisticated than their opponents, but it 
is fully consistent with data from nonfictional games of this kind.   35 
> 1/2, the equilibrium probability with which pursuers go south in the analogous game with no 
north-south asymmetry); but in a counterintuitive way for Ash’s role (p* = 1/4 < 1/2).
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Yet experimental subjects’ aggregate choices in initial responses to games like this tend to 




 McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and 
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005) discuss the experiments with perturbed 2×2 Matching Pennies 
games with payoff perturbations in only one player role reported by Jack Ochs (1995), 
McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000), Goeree and Holt (2001), and Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 
(2003), which yield initial aggregate choices that reflect decision-theoretic intuition in the role 
whose payoffs are perturbed. In the other role, for which the intuition is neutral, aggregate 
choices deviate from equilibrium in the direction that increases expected payoff, given the 
intuitive response in the first role. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Figures 6 and 7) and Goeree, 
Holt, and Palfrey (2005) show that LQRE with fitted precisions can fit these qualitative patterns, 
although it sometimes underpredicts the magnitudes of deviations from equilibrium, especially 
for the player whose payoff is perturbed. A level-k or CH model, either calibrated as described 
above or estimated from the data on initial responses, also predicts these qualitative patterns. 
5. Groucho’s Curse: Zero-Sum Betting and Auctions with Incomplete Information 
 
“I sent the club a wire stating, ‘Please accept my resignation. I don’t want to belong to any 
club that will accept people like me as a member’.” 
 
—Groucho Marx (1959, p. 321), Telegram to the Beverly Hills Friar’s Club  
 
 
“Son,” the old guy says, “No matter how far you travel, or how smart you get, always 
remember this: Someday, somewhere,” he says, a guy is going to come to you and show you 
a nice brand-new deck of cards on which the seal is never broken, and this guy is going to 
offer to bet you that the jack of spades will jump out of this deck and squirt cider in your ear. 
But, son,” the old guy says, “do not bet him, for as sure as you do you are going to get an ear 
full of cider.”  
 
    —Obadiah (“The Sky”) Masterson, quoting his father in Damon Runyon (1932) 
 
                                                 
40 Crawford and Dennis E. Smallwood (1984) discuss the comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in perturbed Matching 
Pennies games, showing that this role-asymmetric intuitiveness is general when both players’ payoffs are perturbed.   
41 Ash’s counterintuitive choice would not contradict this pattern if he were a subject because his revealed type is in the minority.   36 
  Although most laboratory evidence on strategic thinking comes from symmetric-information 
designs, most field evidence and applications involve settings with informational asymmetries. It 
is therefore of great importance to extend whatever can be learned about strategic thinking in 
complete-information games to incomplete-information games. In this section we discuss 
laboratory and field evidence on games with informational asymmetries, focusing on cases 
where the games are sufficiently simple to allow clear inferences about strategic thinking.    
  We begin by discussing evidence from experiments on especially clear examples of games 
with informational asymmetries: zero-sum betting, sealed bid auctions, and the “Acquiring a 
Company” game. We next discuss analyses using field data from settings with asymmetric 
information. We close with a brief discussion of nonequilibrium auction design, based on an 
extension of level-k models suggested by the analysis of initial responses in auction experiments.  
5.1. Zero-Sum Betting  
  Experiments on zero-sum betting build on Paul R. Milgrom and Nancy Stokey’s (1982) no-
trade theorem, which shows that if traders are weakly risk-averse and have concordant beliefs, 
and the initial allocation is Pareto-efficient relative to the information available at the time, then 
even if traders receive new private information, no weakly mutually beneficial trade is possible. 
Further, if traders are strictly risk-averse, no trade at all is possible. For, any such trade would 
make it common knowledge that both traders had benefited, contradicting the hypothesis that the 
original allocation was Pareto-efficient. This result has been called the Groucho Marx theorem 
because its logic resembles that of our Marx quotation. 
  By contrast with the conclusions of the theorem, speculative zero-sum trades are common in 
real markets. This fact has a number of possible explanations, of which one is nonequilibrium 
strategic thinking. The experiments on zero-sum betting by Brocas, Carrillo, Camerer, and Wang 
(2010) we now discuss have the control required to distinguish between such explanations and 
those based on other factors such as hedging or the joy of gambling (see also Camerer, Ho, and 
Chong 2004, Section VI, and Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer 2009, who both build on Doron 
Sonsino, Ido Erev, and Sharon Gilat 2002 and Ylva Sovik 2009). Brocas et al.’s (2010) design 
can further distinguish between alternative nonequilibrium models of strategic thinking.   37 




The rules of the game and the information structure were publicly announced, with the goal of 
inducing common knowledge. Each of two players, 1 and 2, is given information about which of 
three ex ante equally likely states has occurred, A, B, or C. As indicated by the heavy borders in 
Figure 3, player 1 learns either that the state is {A or B} or that it is C; player 2 learns either that 
the state is A, or that it is {B or C}. Once informed, the players choose simultaneously between 
two decisions: Bet or Pass. A player who chooses Pass earns 10 no matter what the state. If one 
chooses Bet while the other chooses Pass, they both earn 10. If both players choose Bet, they get 
the payoffs in Figure 3, depending on which state has occurred.  
Player/state  A  B  C 
1  25  5  20 
2  0  30  5 
Figure 3. Zero-Sum Betting Game 
 
  This game has a unique trembling-hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
43
  Despite this clear conclusion, in Brocas et al.’s and similar experiments approximately half 
of the subjects bet. To explain this, Brocas et al. proposed a level-k model with a specification 
like those discussed in Section 3, but with L0 adapted to allow for incomplete information. 
Following Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004, Section VI), Brocas et al. assumed that L0 bids 
uniformly randomly, independent of its private information. In judging this specification, bear in 
mind that L0 is meant to describe a player’s model of the instinctive starting point of others’ 
strategic thinking. It is easy enough to imagine L0s that take others’ private information into 
account, but for a player who does not observe such information this would require complex 
 In this equilibrium, 
player 1 told C will Bet because 20 > 10, and player 2 told A will Pass because 0 < 10. Given 
this, player 1 told {A or B} will Pass, because player 2 will Pass if told A, so betting given {A or 
B} yields player 1 at most 5 < 10. Given this, player 2 will Pass if told {B or C}, because player 
1 will Pass if told {A or B}, so betting given {B or C} yields player 2 at most 5 < 10. This covers 
all contingencies and completes the characterization of equilibrium, which shows that the game 
is weakly dominance-solvable in three rounds. No betting takes place in equilibrium in any state. 
                                                 
42 Although our discussion focuses on subjects’ decisions, Brocas et al. (2009) also monitored subjects’ searches for hidden but 
freely accessible payoff information, as in Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford 
(2006). Their analysis of information search reinforces and refines the conclusions of their analysis of decisions.      
43 Trivial equilibria also exist, in which players do not bet because their partners do not bet, though this is weakly dominated.   38 
contingent reasoning. Such reasoning is seldom consistent with results from other settings, and it 
seems behaviorally more plausible to assume that L0 ignores others’ private information. 
  As in previous level-k analyses, Brocas et al. took L1 to best respond to L0, and L2 to best 
respond to L1. Following Crawford and Iriberri (2007a), we call an L1 that best responds to a 
random L0 a “random L1” even though it is not itself random; and we call an L2 that best 
responds to a random L1 a “random L2”. Compare Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982, p. 23) Case A 
“Naïve Behavior,” in which a player simply sticks with his prior. This refusal to draw contingent 
inferences from others’ willingness to bet is implied by random L1’s random model of others. 
Milgrom and Stokey’s Case B “First-Order Sophistication” is then equivalent to our random L2. 
  Given this specification, random L1 player 1s will Bet if told {C} because it yields 20 > 10 if 
player 2 Bets, a random L0 player 2 will bet with probability one-half in either contingency, and 
Betting is otherwise costless. Unlike in equilibrium, Random L1 player 1s will Bet if told {A or 
B} because it yields 25 in state {A} and a random L0 player 2 will bet with probability one-half 
in {A}; it yields 5 in state {B} and a random L0 player 2 will Bet with probability one-half in 
{B}; and the two states are equally likely ex ante, so Betting if told {A or B} yields expected 
payoff (25 + 5)/2 = 15 > 10. Random L1 player 2s will Pass if told {A}, because it yields 0 < 10. 
Unlike in equilibrium, random L1 player 2s will Bet if told {B or C}, because it yields 30 in state 
{B} and a random L0 player 1 will bet with probability one-half in {B}; it yields 5 in state {C} 
and a random L0 player 1 will Bet with probability one-half in {C}; and the two states are 
equally likely ex ante, so Betting if told {B or C} yields expected payoff (30 + 5)/2 = 17.5 > 10. 
Similarly, it can be shown that Random L2 or L3 player 1s will both Pass if told {A or B} but 
Bet if told {C}; that Random L2 player 2s will Pass if told {A} but Bet if told {B or C}; and that 
Random L3 player 2s will Pass without regard to the state. 
  Thus, if all subjects were random L1s, 100% of player 1s would Bet and 67% of player 2s, 
too much in each role; and betting would occur only in states B and C, which is not the case: 
Although all player 1 subjects bet in state C and no player 2 subjects bet in state A, about 62% of 
player 1s bet in {A,B}and 34% of player 2s bet in {C,B}. Alternatively, if all player 1s were 
random L2 or L3 and if all player 2s were random L3, then the level-k models’ predictions would 
coincide with equilibrium predictions and no betting would occur, which again is not the case. 
Brocas et al.’s data analysis finds clusters corresponding to random L1s, L2s, and L3s, and an 
additional cluster of apparently irrational players; and this mixture of types fits significantly   39 
better than any homogeneous model, illustrating the existence of clear, nonequilibrium types and 
the importance of the heterogeneity of strategic thinking. 
  Tomasz Strzalecki (2010) conducts a level-k analysis of games like Rubinstein’s (1989) 
electronic mail game, showing that such models, with bounded depth of reasoning, make 
predictions that are realistically independent of tail assumptions on higher-order beliefs. 
  Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer (2009) conduct a horse race between LQRE and CH for similar 
betting games, which is inconclusive; but on fit they favor their richly parameterized “truncated 
heterogeneous LQRE” model over CH or LQRE. Brocas et al.’s lookup data reinforces their 
level-k interpretation of the decision data, and argues against LQRE or even CH.
44
5.2. Auction Experiments 
  
  There is a rich literature on sealed-bid incomplete information auction experiments, which 
has developed largely independently of the literature on game experiments, despite similar goals 
and methods. In these experiments, whether first-price or (to a lesser extent) second-price, 
independent-private-value or common-value, subjects’ initial responses tend to exhibit 
overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium (e.g. Kagel and Levin 1986 and 
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 2002). The literature has proposed different explanations for 
overbidding: “joy of winning” and/or risk-aversion for private-value auctions, and the winner’s 
curse for common-value auctions. It is vexing that there is no overlap between the explanations 
proposed for private- and common-value auctions, and also that these explanations are only 
loosely related to explanations proposed for deviations from equilibrium in other games. 
  Kagel and Levin (1986) and Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin (2005) sought to unify the 
explanations of nonequilibrium behavior in common-value auctions and other incomplete-
information games where (unlike in private-value auctions) informational inferences are 
relevant. Kagel and Levin formalize the intuition behind the winner’s curse in models in which 
“naïve” bidders do not adjust their value estimates for the information revealed by winning, but 
otherwise follow Bayesian equilibrium. Eyster and Rabin’s notion of “cursed equilibrium”, in 
which people do not fully take the correlation between others’ decisions and private information 
into account, but otherwise follow Bayesian equilibrium, generalizes Kagel and Levin’s model to 
                                                 
44 Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known “strengths” 
and can decide whether to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the 
weaker a low one. If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The only equilibrium is for 
players to always fight, because as in zero-sum betting games, agents have opposing interests for when to compromise. In 
their experiments, by contrast, compromise occurs 50-70% of the time, with less fighting the higher the compromise payoff.   40 
allow intermediate levels of value adjustment ranging from standard equilibrium with full 
adjustment to “fully-cursed” equilibrium with no adjustment; and also from auctions and 
bilateral exchange to other kinds of incomplete-information games.
45
  Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) propose a level-k analysis that provides a way to unify the 
explanation of deviations from equilibrium in initial responses to independent-private-value or 
common-value auctions, without invoking joy of winning, risk-aversion, or cognitive biases.
 However, Kagel and 
Levin’s and Eyster and Rabin’s models both allow players to deviate from equilibrium only to 
the extent that they do not draw correct informational inferences. Thus their predictions coincide 
with equilibrium in games where such inferences are not relevant, and their models do not 
address nonequilibrium behavior in private-value auctions or any complete-information game. 
46
  The key issue is how to specify L0. In auctions there are two natural possibilities: Random 
L0, analogous to the type of the same name in the analysis of zero-sum betting above, bids 
uniformly on the interval between the lowest and highest possible values, independent of its own 
value. Thus it sometimes bids above its own value, as is plausible given its role as people’s 
model of others’ instinctive reactions to the game, given that they do not observe others’ values. 
Alternatively, Truthful L0 bids its expected value conditional on its own signal—a notion that is 
meaningful in auctions, though not in all incomplete-information games. 
 
Their analysis establishes a connection between large bodies of experiments on auctions and 
experiments on strategic thinking in complete information settings. 
  Crawford and Iriberri build separate type hierarchies on these L0s, stopping for simplicity at 
L2: Random (Truthful) Lk is defined by iterating best responses from Random (Truthful) L0; and 
allow each subject to be one of the types, from either hierarchy. They then explore the optimal 
bidding strategies for each type, in preparation for taking the model to the data from 
representative auction experiments for the leading environments. 
  For a given Lk type, just as in an equilibrium analysis, the optimal bid must take into account 
value adjustment for the information revealed by winning in common-value auctions, and in 
first-price auctions the bidding trade-off between the higher price paid if the bidder wins and the 
probability of winning. Crawford and Iriberri show that the level-k model allows a tractable 
                                                 
45 Eyster and Rabin show that cursed equilibrium can explain zero-sum betting with a probability that is positive but less than 
one. 
46 See also Uri Gneezy’s (2005) level-k analysis of complete-information auctions, in which the level-k model’s performance is 
disappointing, perhaps because complete-information auctions have structures that stress-test the model.   41 
characterization of those aspects of the bidder’s problem, which closely parallels Milgrom and 
Robert J. Weber’s (1982) equilibrium characterization.  
  With regard to value adjustment, Random L1, like Kagel and Levin’s naïve bidders and 
Eyster and Rabin’s fully cursed bidders, does not condition on winning because Random L0 
bidders bid randomly independently of their values, hence Random L1 thinks that beating them 
is uninformative. Crawford and Iriberri’s other types do condition on winning in various ways, 
but this conditioning tends to make bidders’ bids strategic substitutes, in that the higher others’ 
bids are, the greater the (negative) adjustment. Thus, to the extent that Random L1 overbids 
relative to equilibrium, Random L2 tends to underbid: If it’s bad news that you beat equilibrium 
bidders, it’s even worse news to have beaten overbidders. The bidding tradeoff, by contrast, can 
go either way, depending on the distribution of values, just as in an equilibrium analysis.  
  Overall, the analysis shows that the conclusions of equilibrium auction theory are 
surprisingly robust to the structured failures of the equilibrium assumption allowed by a level-k 
model: Essentially all of the results of equilibrium analysis survive, qualitatively, except those 
aspects that rely heavily on the ex ante symmetry across players of their model. Those last results 
are altered even when players are objectively symmetrical, because level-k players, unlike 
equilibrium players, have simpler models of other players than they do of themselves.   
  Empirically, the question is whether an estimated mixture of Random L1 overbidding and 
Random L2 underbidding fits the data better than equilibrium plus noise, cursed equilibrium, or, 
for private-value auctions like Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey’s (2002), LQRE. In three of the four 
leading cases Crawford and Iriberri study, a level-k model does better than those alternatives. For 
the remaining case, Kagel and Levin’s first-price auction, the most flexible cursed equilibrium 
specification has a small advantage over level-k; but this disappears when the cursed equilibrium 
model’s number of parameters is made more comparable to that of the level-k model.  
  Except in Kagel and Levin’s second-price auctions, where many subjects seem to have 
missed the key to optimal bidding and the results seem largely random relative to all the models 
Crawford and Iriberri considered, the estimated type frequencies are quite similar to those 
estimated for non-auction experiments: Large estimated frequencies (59-65%) of random L1, 
smaller but significant frequencies of random L2 (4-9%), truthful L1 (9-18%), Equilibrium (4-
16%), and truthful L2 (1-16%), and zero or very low frequencies of Random L0 or Truthful L0.    42 
  Overall, Crawford and Irriberi’s analysis shows how to extend level-k analysis to an 
important class of incomplete-information games, establishes the robustness of most of the 
conclusions of equilibrium auction theory to level-k failures of the equilibrium assumption, and 
gives a more unified explanation for the systematic patterns of nonequilibrium behavior in 
private- and common-value auctions and other games. 
5.3. Acquiring a Company and the Winner’s Curse 
  Gary Charness and Dan Levin (2009) report experiments that stress-test existing explanations 
of experimental subjects’ failure to take adverse selection effects like those behind the winner's 
curse and related deviations from equilibrium adequately into account. Their experiments are 
based on William F. Samuelson and Max H. Bazerman’s (1985) “Acquiring a Company” game, 
a game-theoretic analog of George A. Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” market. The game has two 
players, a bidder and a responder, both risk-neutral. The responder owns a single indivisible 
object (the company) and bidder makes a single bid for it. If the proposer accepts the bid the 
company is transferred at the bid price, and if not, there is no deal. In either case the game is 
over. The value of the company to the responder is an integer between 0 and 100 inclusive, with 
each of these values equally likely. Only the responder observes his value, before he must decide 
whether to accept; but the bidder knows that, whatever the value, it is 50% larger for him than 
for the responder; and this fact and the value distribution are common knowledge. 
  This game has an essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which the proposer bids 
zero and the responder rejects that bid, but would accept any offer greater than his value. The 
reasoning rests on the proposer drawing a simple contingent inference from the responder’s 
willingness to accept that is like the inference required to overcome the winner’s curse or to 
avoid losing money in zero-sum betting games. Suppose the bidder offers x > 0. The responder 
will then accept if and only if his value is less than x, so that given the uniform distribution, the 
responder’s expected value conditional on acceptance is x/2. Thus the expected value to the 
bidder conditional on acceptance is 3x/4, in which case the transaction makes him lose x/4 on 
average. The optimal bid is therefore 0, and no transfer will occur even though it is common 
knowledge that there are prices at which a transfer is mutually beneficial. 
  Equilibrium of course assumes that people get this inference right, but many people seem to 
find it difficult; and as a result, they make unprofitable positive offers in Acquiring a Company. 
It is natural to ask whether cursed equilibrium or a level-k model can explain this behavior.   43 
  Charness and Levin address this issue via a clever design with “robot” treatments in which 
subjects’ decisions determine their payoffs in a way that is logically identical to the way a 
rational responder’s decisions determine the bidder’s payoffs in Acquiring a Company, but in 
which the robot responder is framed not as another player but as part of the rules of the game. 
The problem that determines the proposer’s optimal decision is then identical to the proposer’s 
problem in the original Acquiring a Company treatment when he assumes the responder will 
make a rational acceptance decision, and so involves the same probabilistic inferences. But 
because the new problem no longer involves other’s decisions, cursed equilibrium or level-k 
players, taken literally, are predicted to get it right. Thus Charness and Levin’s design sharply 
separates explanations of the winner’s curse and related phenomena based on cursed equilibrium 
or level-k thinking from explanations based on nonstrategic failures of probabilistic judgment. 
Their main finding, that their subjects are cursed as much as in a standard Acquiring a Company 
design, suggests that cursed equilibrium or level-k models miss part of what is going on. 
  Asen Ivanov, Levin, and Muriel Niederle (2010) use subjects’ initial responses to a different 
auction game to further investigate whether the winner’s curse is driven primarily by judgment 
failures or instead by deviations from equilibrium beliefs as in cursed equilibrium or a level-k 
analysis. Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle’s design is based on Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer’s 
(2002) Maximum Game, a second-price common-value auction in which bidders’ common value 
equals the maximum of their independent and identically distributed value signals. The 
Maximum Game is weakly dominance-solvable in two steps, with truthful bidding as its unique 
equilibrium. Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle run three treatments, Baseline, ShowBidFn, and 
MinBid, but most importantly they focus on two different parts of each treatment. In part I 
subjects are randomly paired with other subjects to play the Maximum Game for 11 periods, 
with their value signals sampled without replacement from a set of 11 possible values (so that a 
subject’s 11 bids reveal the entire function mapping his values into bids). In part II subjects again 
play the Maximum Game, but now against a computer “robot” that draws values in random 
order, again sampled without replacement, and uses the subject’s own bidding function from part 
I to map them into bids. Thus in part II each subject effectively plays against his own past self, 
and he knows that; although he is not reminded of his bidding function from part I. ShowBidFn 
is identical to the Baseline except that in its part II subjects are explicitly reminded of their part I   44 
bidding functions. Min-Bid is identical to the Baseline except that subjects are not allowed to bid 
below their own value signals; this makes truthful bidding a weakly dominant strategy. 
  Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle find that many subjects make weakly dominated bids in part I of 
the Baseline, most overbidding as in other auction experiments. Much of this overbidding 
persists in part II, where less than a quarter of the subjects even approximately best respond to 
their own part I bidding behavior. These patterns mostly persist in the ShowBidFn and MinBid 
treatments, with the frequency of overbidding substantially higher in the MinBid treatment 
(where underbidding was not allowed) than in the Baseline and ShowBidFn treatments. 
  Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle then argue that if bidding behavior is driven by non-equilibrium 
beliefs, for subjects who overbid in part I there should be less overbidding in part II of each 
treatment, where there is no strategic interaction so beliefs are known, relative to that treatment’s 
part I, where beliefs must be predicted. They also argue that there should be less overbidding in 
part I of MinBid, where truthful bidding is weakly dominant, than in parts I of the Baseline and 
ShowBidFn, where truthful bidding is the only strategy that survives two steps of iterated weak 
dominance. Because there were widespread violations of weak dominance and there was not 
significantly less overbidding in either case, they claim that their results are evidence against 
non-equilibrium beliefs-based models such as level-k or cursed equilibrium. 
  In our view Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle’s conclusion is not well supported. First, parts II of 
their three treatments are decision environments, not games; and part I of MinBid tests only 
reliance on simple weak dominance. Thus only parts I of Baseline and ShowBidFn have much to 
say about how subjects’ beliefs are formed. Parts II of all three treatments simply stress-test all 
beliefs-based optimizing models, and part I of MinBid tests only a minimal restriction on beliefs. 
Charness and Levin (2009) showed that few subjects are up to the probabilistic inferences 
needed in a game with a winner’s curse as simple as that in Acquiring a Company, yet the 
Maximum Game requires far more subtle inferences: As Bulow and Klemperer (2002) said of its 
equilibrium predictions, “…the Maximum Game, provides a good illustration of how a different 
choice of value function…can make it easy to obtain extreme ‘perverse’ results.” Ivanov, Levin, 
and Niederle’s rejection of beliefs-based models simply reconfirms Charness and Levin’s finding 
that settings where rational behavior requires complex inferences can make subjects deviate from 
equilibrium, without suggesting an alternative model of what subjects are doing.   45 
  Second, Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle rest their rejection of beliefs-based models entirely on 
violations of simple dominance and indirect tests comparing game-theoretic and decision-
theoretic settings, without explicitly analyzing any specific model.
47 Costa-Gomes and Makoto 
Shimoji (2010) also question the suitability of Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle’s design to test 
belief-based theories in general and level-k models in particular. They also show that a standard 
level-k model fares quite well in direct tests using their data, approximately accounting for over 
90% of subjects’ bids in the MinBid treatment—albeit with a predominance of L2 subjects rather 
than the L1 subjects whose behavior Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle focused on in their analysis.
48
  To sum up, in our view neither Charness and Levin’s nor Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle’s 
results undermine the strong experimental support for level-k/CH or cursed equilibrium models. 
Those models were formulated for settings in which the main difficulty is predicting and 
responding to other players’ decisions, and Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri 
(2007a) follow the common practice of simplifying other aspects of the problem to make their 
central points as clearly as possible. There is no reason to expect a model so specified to translate 
unmodified to settings in which the complexity has been shifted from the “other people” part of 
the problem to the “own decisions” part; although it is clear than one can falsify existing 
specifications by making the own decisions part sufficiently complex. 
 
  Instead, we read Charness and Levin’s and related results as pointing out the need for a 
model general enough to encompass both nonequilibrium strategic thinking and nonstrategic 
failures of judgment. Before specifying such a model, we need to know more about why subjects 
have so much trouble with Bayesian updating and best responding in designs like Charness and 
Levin’s and Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle’s. We suspect that people have trouble with reasoning 
that is contingent on future events, even in settings where the contingency is as simple and 
immediate as it is in their designs. Possibly people don’t update correctly because they have 
“representativeness” bias (underweighting the prior) or “conservatism” bias (overweighting the 
                                                 
47 Aside from their indirectness, such comparisons are less than usually reliable because decision environments shed no light on 
whether subjects’ bids are best-responses to the beliefs they would hold in an analogous strategic situation. As Ivanov, Levin, 
and Niederle say (p. 1436), “…it is possible that subjects employ very different cognitive mechanisms in interactions with 
other players; such interactions may trigger all sorts of thought processes about others’ reasoning, beliefs, and intentions.” 
They go on to say “In our study, subjects play against other people”; but the robots in the part II treatments are not equivalent 
to other people for this argument, because subjects’ bidding functions are predetermined and known. 
48 Even in much simpler settings, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) found that subjects’ actions often deviate from the best 
responses to their incentivized elicited beliefs, while also finding  that a level-k model with suitable allowance for errors fits 
the data better than the leading alternatives.  
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prior). Or possibly they update correctly but don’t always choose rationally, given their 
posteriors. More experiments are needed to discriminate sufficiently among these alternatives. 
5.4. Naive and Sophisticated Traders in Speculative Markets 
  Ricardo Serrano-Padial (2010) conducts an illuminating analysis of the interaction between 
continua of naïve and sophisticated traders in prediction and other speculative markets. Naïve 
traders include any whose trading decisions can be expressed as functions of the data of the game 
and their own private values, without solving a fixed-point problem such as that required to 
compute an equilibrium. Sophisticated traders follow equilibrium in the market, but unlike 
equilibrium traders, taking the frequency and behavior of naïve traders rationally into account.  
  Serrano-Padial’s analysis proceeds by plugging in the behavior of the naive traders to reduce 
the market to a “reduced market” whose equilibrium is a fixed point in the supply and demand 
behavior of the sophisticated traders, taking the behavior of the naïve traders as given. He then 
characterizes the equilibrium in the reduced market using fairly standard methods. 
  Depending on the frequency of sophisticated traders, the market can be in one of three 
phases. When there are enough sophisticated agents to counteract naive agents’ deviations from 
equilibrium, the usual rational-expectations equilibrium ensues, even if there is a nonnegligible 
frequency of naïve traders. With an intermediate frequency of sophisticated traders, the market 
segments into intervals of the space of possible valuations in which sophisticated traders never 
bid; and disjoint intervals in which both naïve and sophisticated traders bid. In the “naïve” 
intervals, naïve traders have the pivotal influence on pricing, which deviates systematically from 
equilibrium. In the “sophisticated” intervals, pricing is just as predicted in the standard model. 
  An arbitrage argument shows that the deviations from equilibrium in naïve intervals must 
involve a local quasi-“favorite-longshot” bias, in which in a given interval, relatively low 
valuations are overpriced but high valuations are underpriced. (This is only a “quasi-bias” 
because it follows from sophisticated trader’s equilibrium responses to the behavior of naïve 
traders, not directly from any explicit decision-theoretic bias.) Finally, with a low frequency of 
sophisticated traders, pricing is almost everywhere determined by the behavior of naïve traders. 
  Serrano-Padial’s methods can be viewed as market analogs of Crawford’s (2003) game-
theoretic analysis of the interaction between sophisticated and level-k players in a model of 
strategic communication (Section 11), and the two analyses have parallel transitions between   47 
phases as the frequency of sophisticated agents varies. The fact that similar methods yield similar 
results in these disparate settings suggests that the methods will be of more general usefulness. 
5.5. Field Studies: Movie Opening and Lowest Unique Positive Integer Games  
  Alexander Brown, Camerer, and Dan Lovallo (2010) use field data to study an incomplete-
information signaling game with verifiable signals. Film distributors face a choice between “cold 
opening” a movie and pre-releasing them to critics in the hope that favorable reviews will 
increase profits. In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, cold-opening should not be profitable, because 
moviegoers will infer low quality for cold-opened movies and the process will unravel. Yet 
distributors sometimes cold-open movies, and in a set of 856 widely released movies, cold 
opening increased domestic box ofﬁce revenue by 15% over movies of similar quality that were 
reviewed before release (though not in foreign markets and DVD sales). This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that some moviegoers did not infer low quality from cold opening. However, 
movie distributors do not appear to take advantage of moviegoers lack of sophistication, since 
only 7% of movies were opened cold despite the expected-profit advantage.  
  After preliminary tests that rule out more conventional explanations, Brown, Camerer, and 
Lovallo seek to explain these results by comparing variants of cursed equilibrium, LQRE, and 
CH models.
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49 In the CH model, Lk best responds to Lk-1 rather than an estimated mixture of all lower-level types as it would in a CH model; 
but Lk responds to Lk-1’s decision noise as in an LQRE model, a choice that is not standard in level-k or CH models. Further, L0 
for moviegoers assumes a uniform distribution over the whole range of possible qualities; although sample-mean quality might 
seem more natural here, the authors say that that does not work well either. 
 The best fitting cursed-equilibrium model has moviegoers almost fully cursed 
(drawing no inferences regarding cold-opened movies) but studios not cursed at all; given the 
specification, the resulting model is like a partially cursed (moviegoers but not distributors) 
version of LQRE. The best fitting CH model again has moviegoers almost fully cursed (τ, the 
average k, is 1.12 where 1 is fully cursed, which given the assumed Poisson distribution for k 
implies that the population frequency of L0s is 33%) but studios very sophisticated (τ = 8.5). The 
best fitting CH model has a significant advantage in fit over the best fitting cursed-equilibrium or 
LQRE model. Overall, neither model really explains the behavior of studios, given the mismatch 
needed between the degree of strategic thinking of moviegoers and distributors. This may be 
unsurprising, because the simple model the authors sketch and estimate at the end is static. There 
has been a huge recent trend in the percentage of cold-opened movies (Brown, Camerer, and   48 
Lovallo 2010, Figure 2), complicated by changes in technology but probably still significant, 
which suggests that static models cannot span the full sample period. 
  Östling, Wang, Eileen Chou, and Camerer (Forthcoming) study a novel set of field data from 
a Swedish gambling company, which ran a competition for a short period of time involving a 
“lowest unique positive integer” or LUPI game. (They also studied experimental data from 
parallel treatments.) In the LUPI game, players strategically simultaneously pick positive 
integers and the player who chose the lowest unique (not chosen by anyone else) number wins a 
prize. Except for the uniqueness requirement, the game is like a first-price auction. 
  The game would have complete information except that participants had no way to know 
how many others would enter in a given week. The authors deal with this by adapting Myerson’s 
(2000) Poisson games model, in which fully rational players face Poisson-distributed uncertainty 
about the number of players. They characterize the LUPI game’s unique symmetric Poisson-
Nash equilibrium, and compare it to the predictions of versions of QRE and CH models, using 
both the field data and data from experiments using a scaled-down version of the LUPI game.
  Both the field and laboratory data show participants choosing very low and very high 
numbers too often, relative to the Poisson-Nash equilibrium, and avoiding round and/or salient 
numbers.
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  In comparing the data to the predictions of versions of QRE and CH, Östling et al. assume 
that both have power rather than the usual logit error distributions, and they allow the CH types 
to best respond to the noise in others’ decisions.
 However, initial responses are surprisingly close to the equilibrium, given that the 
setting makes it almost inconceivable that participants could be computing it. Learning brings 
them even closer in subsequent periods. 
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5.6. Level-k Auction Design 
 They find that relative to the Poisson-Nash 
equilibrium, power QRE predicts too few low-number choices while CH predicts too many—the 
pattern observed in the field data. Thus QRE gets the deviations from equilibrium qualitatively 
wrong. However, the experimental data discriminate much less sharply between the theories.      
  A number of recent papers reconsider mechanism design taking a “behavioral” view of 
individual decisions or probabilistic judgment, but to date there are very few analyses of design 
                                                 
50 Salience plays a similar role in Crawford and Iriberri’s (2007b) analysis of hide-and-seek games (Section 9). 
51 A standard CH model would not fit the LUPI data at all well: L1 would choose 1, L2 2, L3 3 or less, and Lk k or less. But best 
responding to power errors allows L2’s modal choice to be as high as 5 (Östling et al. Forthcoming, Figure 3)). This is not a 
criticism of the Östling et al.’s CH analysis per se: rather, the LUPI game reveals a general limitation of the structural features 
of thinking steps models like level-k or CH.   49 
outside the equilibrium paradigm. Yet design inherently involves the creation of new games, and 
it may be important for an application to work the first time. Further, assuming equilibrium can 
yield theoretically optimal designs that are too complex for confidence in equilibrium behavior. 
  Replacing equilibrium with a model that better describes people’s responses to novel games 
should allow us to design more effective mechanisms. It also suggests an evidence-based way to 
assess the robustness of mechanisms, something previously left to intuition. A mechanism that is 
robust in the sense that it implements the desired outcome in dominant strategies or after a small 
number of rounds of iterated dominance will evoke the desired response from most or all level-k 
types that are empirically likely to be observed. It may therefore perform better in practice than a 
mechanism that can theoretically implement better outcomes, but only in equilibrium. 
  Crawford, Tamar Kugler, Zvika Neeman, and Ady Pauzner (2009) explore relaxing the 
equilibrium assumption in mechanism design by conducting a level-k analysis of optimal auction 
design. They consider the leading case of an expected-revenue maximizing single-object sealed-
bid auction with two symmetric bidders who have independent private values, for which 
Myerson (1981) gives a complete equilibrium-based analysis. To focus on strategic behavior, 
they maintain standard rationality assumptions regarding decisions and probabilistic judgment. 
  They model strategic behavior via a level-k model that follows Crawford and Iriberri’s 
(2007a) analysis of data from leading auction experiments, with either a random L0 that bids 
uniformly over the natural range of bids or a truthful L0 that bids its private value. They assume 
that bidders are drawn from a given population of level-k types, known to the designer. In 
examples, they consider what reserve prices are optimal and how much revenue they yield in 
first-price auctions. They also consider the optimality of auction forms and the use of exotic 
auctions that exploit bidders’ nonequilibrium beliefs to exceed Myerson’s revenue bound.  
  Crawford et al. show, trivially and unsurprisingly, that with independent private values, 
revenue-equivalence breaks down. Because a second-price auction makes the equilibrium bid a 
dominant strategy, level-k bids coincide with equilibrium bids, hence a second-price auction 
yields only the equilibrium expected revenue. By contrast, level-k bidders in a first-price auction 
can deviate from equilibrium, and they give an example to show that such an auction with a 
suitable reserve price can yield higher expected revenue than the best second-price auction. They 
also give examples in which the optimal reserve price is large with equilibrium bidders but small 
with level-k bidders, and vice versa. Interesting open questions are when a reserve induces more   50 
aggressive bidding for equilibrium than level-k bidders, and the extent to which this makes 
optimal level-k reserves higher than optimal equilibrium reserves.  
  Finally, Crawford et al. give an example to show that in theory, a designer can use exotic 
auction forms to exploit level-k bidders’ nonequilibrium beliefs to obtain very large expected 
revenues. They note, however, that their formulation of the design problem takes the level-k 
model’s specification as given, independent of the auction design, just as the standard 
formulation assumes that bidders will play an equilibrium for any design. Although the 
specification is based on substantial experimental evidence, there is reason to doubt the 
exogeneity assumption, particularly for exotic auctions that go beyond the evidence on which 
our specification is based. A general formulation of the design problem must take a position on 
how the design influences the rules that describe bidders’ behavior and develop new methods to 
deal mathematically with that influence.  
  Even without such influences, the heterogeneity of level-k beliefs and behavior greatly 
complicates the characterization of optimal auctions. In the standard analysis there is no loss of 
generality in using the revelation principle to restrict attention to direct mechanisms because, if 
equilibrium is assumed (with a selection rule in case of multiple equilibria), a bidder’s private 
value is all that is needed to predict his behavior. Given the restriction to direct mechanisms, the 
design problem is well-behaved enough that it is guaranteed to have a solution. The example 
given in the paper shows that this is no longer the case with level-k bidders, even if their level-k 
types are all the same, and even if this is known to the designer. With a heterogeneous 
population of types, the problem becomes more complex. Bidders with the same private values 
but different level-k types have different beliefs and will generally behave differently. It appears 
that Myerson’s (1981) methods can be used to characterize an optimal auction if the designer 
knows that the population is homogeneous, and knows its type; and if the class of possible 
designs is restricted to rule out those that are too exotic for an optimal auction to exist. But if the 
population is heterogeneous the problem becomes multidimensional and much more difficult; 
and the high-dimensional reporting mechanisms one would consider for this case complicate the 
specification of L0 and the influence of design on behavior. 
  Behaviorally optimal auction design poses interesting challenges, and meeting them should 
increase the practical usefulness of design. 
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6. Kahneman’s Entry Magic: Coordination via Symmetry-Breaking 
 
    “…to a psychologist, it looks like magic.” 
        —Kahneman (1988), quoted in Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) 
   
Kahneman’s “magic” refers to the fact that subjects in his own and others’ market-entry 
experiments (see also Amnon Rapoport et al. 1998 and Rapoport and Daryl A. Seale 2002) 
achieve systematically better coordination ex post than in the natural equilibrium benchmark.
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  In these experiments, n subjects choose simultaneously between entering (“In”) and staying 
out (“Out”) of a market with given capacity. In yields a given positive profit if no more subjects 
enter than a given market capacity; but a given negative profit if too many enter. For simplicity, 
Out yields 0 profit, no matter how many subjects enter. Because players cannot distinguish their 
roles, it is not sensible to predict systematic differences across roles in behavior. Thus, the 
natural equilibrium benchmark is the unique, symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which 
each player enters with a given probability that makes all players indifferent between In and Out. 
This mixed-strategy equilibrium yields an expected number of entrants approximately equal to 
market capacity, but there is a positive probability that either too many or too few will enter. 
Even so, subjects in market-entry experiments have systematically better coordination ex post 
(number of entrants stochastically closer to market capacity) than in the symmetric equilibrium. 
 
  In these games, efficient coordination requires breaking the symmetry of players’ roles. The 
same issues arise in field settings such as those studied using incomplete-information models by 
Goldfarb and Yang (2009) and Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) (Section 6.2); and those considered in 
our discussion of the nonequilibrium econometrics of such games (Section 8).    
6.1. A level-k Analysis of Two-Person Entry/Battle of the Sexes Games  
  Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004, Section III.C) explain Kahneman’s magic via a CH model, 
in which the heterogeneity of strategic thinking allows some players to mentally simulate others’ 
entry decisions and accommodate them, which in entry games yields coordination benefits for 
all. Here we illustrate Camerer, Ho, and Chong’s analysis in a two-person Battle of the Sexes 
                                                 
52 Kahneman’s statement does not qualify as folk game theory because only a game theorist would be surprised by these results.   52 
game, which is like a two-person market-entry game with capacity one. For simplicity, we also 
substitute a level-k model for their CH model.
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  Consider a two-person Battle of the Sexes game with a > 1, as in Figure 4. The unique 
symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with p ≡ Pr{In} = a/(1+a) for both players. The 
mixed-strategy equilibrium expected coordination rate is 2p(1 – p) = 2a/(1+a)
2, and players’ 
equilibrium expected payoffs are a/(1+a). This expected coordination rate is maximized when a 
= 1, where it takes the value ½. With a > 1 the expected payoffs are a/(1+a) < 1: worse for each 
player than his worst pure-strategy equilibrium. As a → ∞, 2a/(1 + a)
2 → 0 like 1/a. 
  
  In  Out 








  Figure 4. Battle of the Sexes 
   Now consider a level-k model in which each player follows one of four types, L1, L2, L3, or 
L4, with each role filled by a draw from the same distribution. For simplicity assume the 
frequency of L0 is 0, and that L0 chooses uniformly randomly, with Pr{In} = Pr{Out} = 1/2. 
Type pairings  L1  L2  L3  L4 
L1  In, In  In, Out  In, In  In, Out 
L2  Out, In  Out, Out  Out, In  Out, Out 
L3  In, In  In, Out  In, In  In, Out 
L4  Out, In  Out, Out  Out,In  Out, Out 
Table 2. Outcomes in Battle of the Sexes 
 
  L1s mentally simulate L0s’ random decisions and best respond, thus, with a > 1, choosing In; 
L2s choose Out; L3s choose In; and L4s choose Out. The predicted outcome distribution is 
determined by the outcomes of the possible type pairings (Table 2) and the type frequencies. If 
both roles are filled from the same distribution, players have equal ex ante payoffs, proportional 
                                                 
53 Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004, Section III.C) and Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005, Section 2.1) argue that in this context, CH 
models fit better than level-k models because they yield smooth monotonicity of entry rates as market capacity increases, as in 
the data, while a level-k model implies a step function; and because CH models imply that beliefs converge to correct beliefs 
in the limit as k increases, unlike level-k models which cycle perpetually in these games. However in most of the datasets 
Camerer, Ho, and Chong consider, unlike in their stylized CH model, there are congestion effects that allow payoff-sensitive 
logit errors like those in a typical level-k analysis, which smooth things as well. Further, cycling or correctness of beliefs in the 
limit have little or no relevance when k seldom exceeds 3. One question we do not consider here is whether a level-k model 
can explain the fact that entry rates are too high for low capacities and too low for high, which the CH model explains by 
estimating a high frequency of a random L0 type; logit errors for higher level-k types can probably explain this as well.  
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to the expected coordination rate. L3 behaves like L1, and L4 like L2. Lumping L1 and L3 
together and letting v denote their total probability, and lumping L2 and L4 together, the 
expected coordination rate is 2v(1 – v), maximized at v = ½ where it takes the value ½. Thus for 
v near ½, which is behaviorally plausible, the coordination rate is near ½. For more extreme 
values the rate is worse, converging to 0 as v → 0 or 1. But because the equilibrium rate of 2a/(1 
+ a)
2 → 0 like 1/a, even for moderate values of a, the level-k coordination rate is higher. 
  This analysis highlights a drawback of level-k/CH models, in that in the absence of payoff-
sensitive errors, their predictions are independent of a as long as a > 1, while in experiments with 
similar games behavior is often sensitive to such parameter variations. Adding payoff-sensitive 
errors, particularly when starting with a CH model, would help to remedy this, but probably not 
enough to make the models fully descriptive of observed behavior. 
  The level-k analysis suggests a view of tacit coordination profoundly different from the 
traditional view, and illustrates the importance of the heterogeneity of strategic thinking the 
model allows. With level-k thinking, equilibrium and selection principles such as risk- or payoff-
dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1987) play no direct role in players’ thinking. Coordination, 
when it occurs, is an almost accidental (though statistically predictable) by-product of the use of 
nonequilibrium decision rules. Even though players’ decisions are simultaneous and there is no 
communication or observation of the other’s decision, the predictable heterogeneity of strategic 
thinking allows more sophisticated players such as L2s to mentally simulate the decisions of less 
sophisticated players such as L1s and accommodate them, just as Stackelberg followers would. 
This mental simulation doesn’t work perfectly, because an L2 is as likely to be paired with 
another L2 as an L1. Neither would it work if strategic thinking were homogeneous. But it’s very 
surprising that it works at all. 
6.2. Field Studies: Cognitive Hierarchy Analyses of Entry Games  
  In this section we review two field studies of incomplete-information entry games, which 
both use CH models. These studies provide only limited comparison of alternative models of 
strategic thinking, but they are of particular interest because they are among the first studies of 
nonequilibrium models of strategic thinking using field data. 
Goldfarb and Yang (2009) apply an incomplete-information CH model to explain choices by 
managers at 2,233 Internet Service Providers (ISP) in 1997 whether or not to offer their 
customers access through 56K (versus the standard then, 33K) modems. There were two possible   54 
56K technologies: Rockwell Semiconductor’s K56Flex and US Robotics’s X2. Thus an ISP 
manager could make one of four choices: (i) adopt neither technology, (ii) adopt Rockwell’s, (iii) 
adopt US Robotics’s, or (iv) adopt both. Controlling for market and ISP-specific characteristic, 
Goldfarb and Yang, adapted the CH model to describe the heterogeneity in ability or strategic 
sophistication among the SPI managers in these decisions. They assumed (departing from the 
usual L0 specification) that an L0 manager maximizes profits on the assumption that he will be a 
monopolist; an L1 manager on the assumption that his competitors will be L0s; an L2 manager 
on the assumption that his competitors will be an estimated mixture of L0s and L1s, and so on. 
Goldfarb and Yang found significant evidence of heterogeneity of sophistication among 
managers, with an estimated τ, the average k in a CH model, of 2.67—seemingly higher than 
most previous estimates, but their L0 is in some respects akin to an L1, which would bring it 
more in line with previous estimates. The CH model fits no better than a Bayesian equilibrium 
plus noise model, but the CH estimates have interesting and plausible implications. Interestingly, 
they suggest that relative to Bayesian equilibrium, heterogeneity of strategic thinking slowed the 
diffusion of the new 56K technology, with more strategic managers less likely to adopt, 
anticipating more competition. Managers behaved more strategically, in the sense of higher 
estimated ks, if they competed in larger cities, with more firms, or in markets with more educated 
populations. Finally, those managers estimated to be more strategic in 1997 were more likely to 
survive through April 2007. We note however that in a CH model, though not a level-k model, a 
higher k implies a more accurate model of others, hence higher expected profits. Thus, in a CH 
model a firm that does well in the market must have had a higher k; and the model rules out the 
possibility that a firm might err by perceiving others as being of a higher level than in reality. 
Only a model that allows the latter possibility allows independent inferences about a firm’s level 
of sophistication and its beliefs about others’ sophistication.  
Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) applied an incomplete-information CH model to explain 
managers’ choices whether or not to enter local U. S. telecommunications markets after the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which allowed free competition in such markets. They use 
Goldfarb and Yang’s (2009) specification of L0. They found that more experienced and/or better 
educated managers did better, in the sense of entering markets with fewer competitors, on 
average; having better survival rates; and having higher revenues, conditional on survival. 
Estimated strategic thinking goes up from 1998 to 2002. The CH model fits much better than a   55 
Bayesian equilibrium plus noise model in 1998, but only slightly better in 2002, in keeping with 
the view that models like CH are well suited to initial responses to novel situations, but are less 
relevant once players have had enough experience to converge to equilibrium. 
   
7. Bank Runs: Coordination via Assurance 
  “A crude but simple game, related to Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig’s (1983) 
celebrated analysis of bank runs, illustrates some of the issues involved here. Imagine that 
everyone who has invested $10 with me can expect to earn $1, assuming that I stay solvent. 
Suppose that if I go bankrupt, investors who remain lose their whole $10 investment, but 
that an investor who withdraws today neither gains nor loses. What would you do? Each 
individual judgment would presumably depend on one's assessment of my prospects, but 
this in turn depends on the collective judgment of all of the investors. 
 
  Suppose, first, that my foreign reserves, ability to mobilize resources, and economic 
strength are so limited that if any investor withdraws I will go bankrupt. It would be a Nash 
equilibrium (indeed, a Pareto-dominant one) for everyone to remain, but (I expect) not an 
attainable one. Someone would reason that someone else would decide to be cautious and 
withdraw, or at least that someone would reason that someone would reason that someone 
would withdraw, and so forth. This…would likely lead to large-scale withdrawals, and I 
would go bankrupt. It would not be a close-run thing. …Keynes’s beauty contest captures a 
similar idea. 
 
  Now suppose that my fundamental situation were such that everyone would be paid off as 
long as no more than one-third of the investors chose to withdraw. What would you do 
then? Again, there are multiple equilibria: everyone should stay if everyone else does, and 
everyone should pull out if everyone else does, but the more favorable equilibria seems 
much more robust.” 
 
      —Lawrence H. Summers (2000). 
 
  Summers here views bank runs as an n-person coordination game with Pareto-ranked 
equilibria, a kind of generalized Stag Hunt game as in Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model. A 
simplified version of his game can be represented by a payoff table as in Figure 5. 
  
    Summary statistic 
    In  Out 
Representative player 
In  1  -10 
Out  0  0 
Figure 5. Bank Runs 
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  The summary statistic is a measure of whether or not the required number of investors stays 
In. In Summers’s first example, all investors must stay In to prevent the bank from collapsing, so 
the summary statistic takes the value In if and only if all but the representative player stay In. In 
his second example two-thirds of the investors need to stay In, so the summary statistic takes the 
value In if and only if (adding in the representative player) this is the case. 
  These games pose the problem of coordination via assurance in a starkly simple form. In 
each example there are two pure-strategy equilibria: “all-In” and “all-Out”.
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  Summers’ discussion presumes that some equilibrium will describe people’s responses to the 
one-shot game of his model. Given that few people can have had enough experience with closely 
analogous bank runs to make a learning justification for equilibrium plausible, we judge his 
arguments from the standpoint of modeling strategic thinking rather than learning.   
 All-In is better for 
everyone, but when the summary statistic is as extreme as in Summers’s first example and n is 
large enough, all-In is also sufficiently fragile to make it risky for an individual player to play In. 
  Here as elsewhere, models that make unique predictions have important advantages and are 
accordingly favored in the literature. Refinements such as risk- or payoff-dominance (Harsanyi 
and Selten 1987) are the traditional route to unique predictions in coordination games. 
  In Summers’ examples, payoff-dominance—in this context, Pareto-efficiency within the set 
of equilibria—uniquely favors the all-In equilibrium for any population size n; but as Summers 
suggests, the coordination it requires is behaviorally implausible here, even for small n. 
  Risk-dominance is more plausible. Here it selects the equilibrium with the largest “basin of 
attraction”—the set of initial beliefs that yield convergence of best responses to that equilibrium, 
assuming independence of players’ beliefs about others’ strategies. In two-person games with the 
structure of Summers’ examples (Figure 5), risk-dominance therefore selects the equilibrium that 
results if each player best responds to a uniform prior over others’ strategies, just as random L1 
does (and thus just as random Lk does for k > 1). In n-person games like Summers’ examples, 
given independence of players’ beliefs, risk-dominance again selects the “all-L1” equilibrium. 
For Summers’ payoffs (Figure 5), whether all investors or only two-thirds must stay In to 
prevent collapse, the L1 decision is Out and risk-dominance selects the all-Out equilibrium for 
any n. Even with much less extreme payoffs, say with -1.5 replacing -10, and with only two-
                                                 
54 There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the probability that the summary statistic equals In just balances the 
benefits of In and Out; but this equilibrium is behaviorally implausible.   57 
thirds In needed to prevent collapse, risk-dominance favors all-Out for all n, because no n makes 
the probability at least 0.6 that at least two-thirds of n-1 independent Bernoulli trials yield In. 
Thus, risk-dominance does not adequately reflect Summers’ intuition (or ours) in his examples. 
  Many people are skeptical of risk-dominance as a positive model of strategic thinking in 
initial responses to games. As Summers’ discussion illustrates, many of them take comfort in the 
fact that in simple bank runs games, risk-dominance can be justified via a “global games” 
analysis as in Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (1998) (see also Morris and Shin 2003, 
Section 2.3.3), which has become the workhorse model of behavior in bank runs games. A global 
games model replaces the original complete-information game with an incomplete-information 
version with stochastic payoff perturbations that satisfy particular distributional assumptions. 
Those assumptions make the perturbed version, unlike the original game, dominance-solvable, 
with a unique equilibrium that in sufficiently simple games coincides with the risk-dominant 
equilibrium of the original game.
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  The experimental analyses of strategic thinking reviewed here (Section 3) suggest that the 
comfort provided by the global games/iterated dominance rationale for risk-dominance is 
illusory. First, the perturbed game is a device chosen not because it is supported by any evidence 
that it accurately models players’ initial responses to any uncertainty they perceive, but simply to 
enable the iterated dominance argument. Second, even granting the realism of the perturbed 
game, the evidence stops far short of supporting the indefinite (though usually finite) reliance on 
iterated dominance that is needed to make a global games analysis yield a precise prediction. 
 A global-games analysis then implies unique equilibrium 
selection via iterated dominance or iterated knowledge of rationality (Bernheim 1984 and Pearce 
1984), without recourse to a behaviorally questionable risk-dominance refinement. 
  That said, with a uniform random L0, a level-k/CH analysis yields predictions in Summers’ 
examples strikingly similar to those of the global games approach. As already noted, if random 
L1 responses are in equilibrium against each other, they select the risk-dominant/global games 
                                                 
55 In large-population versions of such games, Morris and Shin (2003, p. 57) advocate initiating a global games analysis via a 
common, naïve “Laplacian” prior, specified so “the prescription for each player is to hypothesize that the proportion of other 
players who will opt for a particular action is a random variable that is uniformly distributed over the unit interval and choose the 
best action under these circumstances”; note the similarity to the starting point of Harsanyi and Selten’s (1986) tracing 
procedure). In large populations a Laplacian prior is a useful shortcut to the results of a global games analysis, and often yields 
results similar to risk-dominance, but with nonlinear payoff functions in finite populations there may be substantive differences. 
For example, with two pure strategies per player, whose payoffs are determined by the aggregate strategy frequencies, Laplacian 
frequencies average 50%, while for an independent L0 the population frequencies are approximately Normal, and for a perfectly 
correlated L0 they are certain to be 50%. Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) generalize these results to large numbers of 
actions, but show that in games other than potential games, the uniqueness of the limiting equilibrium fails in general.   58 
equilibrium. But then, in a CH model as well as a level-k model, the responses of higher types 
are the same as random L1’s. Thus the level-k/CH approach selects the risk-dominant/global 
games equilibrium as well (see for example Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004, Section III.B).
56
  However, unlike the mathematically motivated risk dominance/global games analyses, which 
“black-box” players’ anchoring in a way that draws attention away from market psychology and 
common causes of beliefs, a level-k/CH analysis immediately suggests ways to take such factors 
into account and gracefully accommodates them. First, unlike the risk-dominance/global games 
approach, it is easily combined with an L0 in the style of Graham’s Mr. Market, which models 
the psychology of a representative player’s (or players’) instinctive reaction to news (Section 3). 
Such judgments about market psychology are plainly of central importance in applications, but 
combining them with the purely payoff-structure-based risk-dominance/global games approach 
poses formidable challenges. And because such an L0 is a psychological rather than a strategic 
concept, it is easier to extrapolate its specification across games (as illustrated in Section 9).  
 In 
settings where it is not possible to improve upon the naïve, mathematically neutral prior that 
underlies risk-dominance, a level-k/CH analysis lends predictions based on risk dominance or 
global games some evidence-based support. 
  Second, a level-k/CH approach highlights the issue of how players model the correlation of 
others’ strategy choices in n–person games, which is of great potential importance but to our 
knowledge not considered in the traditional game theory or global-games literatures. 
  Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998) found, in level-k/CH analyses of initial-response data from 
their Nagel-style guessing games, that a model in which players’ models of others are highly 
correlated fit the data better than one in which their models assume independence. Costa-Gomes, 
Crawford, and Iriberri (2009) use the initial-response data from Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s 
(1990, 1991) n–person coordination experiments, with games like Stag Hunt but with seven 
efforts per player and seven Pareto-ranked pure-strategy equilibria, to conduct a horse race 
between equilibrium plus noise with risk- or payoff-dominance (in turn), LQRE, level-k, CH, 
and NI models, with or without correlation in players’ models of others’. They found that 
correlated versions of these models almost always do as well or better than independent versions. 
Among the equilibrium selection criteria, payoff-dominance fits at least as well as the 
                                                 
56 Note that the level-k/CH approach does not justify Laplacian beliefs, which in 2×2 games hypothesize that the proportion of 
others who choose a decision is uniformly distributed over the unit interval.     59 
alternatives, and often better. Among the individualistic models, level-k and CH perform 
comparably well; level-k usually does better than NI or LQRE; CH does slightly better than NI 
or LQRE; and NI does slightly better than LQRE. Overall, payoff-dominant equilibrium fits best, 
noticeably better than level-k and CH. These conclusions are based on limited evidence; but the 
idea that people rely on representative-agent models of others even when it’s inappropriate is 
behaviorally plausible when one considers the subtlety of the probabilistic judgments needed to 
do otherwise and the cognitive difficulty of having diverse models. The conclusion that players’ 
models of others are correlated is also suggested, less directly, by subjects’ notorious inability to 
anticipate group-size effects in settings where they are relevant. 
  A level-k/CH model is easily modified to allow correlation of players’ models of others via 
the specification of L0.
57
  A level-k/CH approach to bank runs games has further advantages. In a level-k/CH model 
players use the same rules to choose their strategies with or without multiple equilibria. As in 
Section 6’s market-entry games, neither equilibrium nor refinements play any role in players’ 
thinking; and coordination when it occurs is an accidental but statistically predictable by-product 
of how players’ nonequilibrium decision rules interact with the game—though this time 
symmetry-breaking is not required, and there is no “magic”. In these symmetric coordination 
games the higher payoffs of equilibria attract level-k/CH as well as equilibrium players, so the 
likely outcome is some equilibrium, which as we have seen is the risk-dominant equilibrium in 
simple games. Importantly, however, a level-k/CH model also predicts the likelihood of 
coordination failure and the forms it may take. Further, in more complex games level-k/CH 
predictions may deviate from those of global games or risk-dominant equilibrium selection 
(Crawford 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Iriberri 2009). In our opinion this is a richer and 
more plausible view of strategic thinking than the one that underlies the global-games approach.  
 Perfect correlation makes players perceive examples like Summers’ as 
quasi-two-person games. Depending on the payoffs and the fragility of the all-In equilibrium, 
this can make all-In more or less likely than when players’ models of others are independent.  
 
                                                 
57 The correlation of players’ models of others is irrelevant in defining payoff-dominance. Risk-dominance is traditionally 
defined assuming independence, but its definition could easily be modified to allow such correlation.   60 
8. Nonequilibrium Econometrics: Structural Alternatives to Incomplete Models 
 
  How might the availability of structural nonequilibrium models that reliably describe initial 
responses to games change the way we think about data? In recent econometric work on 
auctions, market entry games, and other kinds of coordination games, attention centers on 
identification and estimation of the parameters that represent individual players’ payoff 
idiosyncrasies, which are normally unobservable in the field.
58
  Building on the equilibrium-based work, recent work has considered auction, market entry, 
and coordination settings where equilibrium is implausible, and other settings where some 
equilibrium is plausible but it is hard to specify the selection mechanism with confidence. In the 
former settings, the leading approach has been to accept set-valued restrictions such as those 
implied by k-rationalizability (Section 2) as the model’s only implications and use them to 
identify and estimate the resulting incomplete model (Andres Aradillas-Lopez and Elie Tamer 
2008, who call k-rationalizability “level-k rationality”).
 If equilibrium can reasonably be 
assumed, and if a precise mechanism for selection among any multiple equilibria can be 
specified, then it is often possible to identify and estimate the distributions of the payoff 
idiosyncrasies, even without imposing parametric restrictions. 
59
  In the latter settings, a common approach has been to estimate a model that imposes 
equilibrium but is incomplete model in that it does not restrict equilibrium selection (Bresnahan 
and Reiss 1991, Federico Ciliberto and Tamer 2009, and Federico Echenique and Ivana 
Komunjer 2009). This is natural for settings where it is plausible that players have learned to 
play an equilibrium, but the learning process cannot be specified with confidence.   
 This is natural for settings involving 
initial responses, because just as the experimental evidence suggests that equilibrium and even 
rationalizability are not reliable models of initial responses (Section 3), it also suggests that 
initial responses often respect k–rationalizability for sufficiently low values of k.  
  In the absence of evidence to guide reliable precise specifications of nonequilibrium behavior 
or equilibrium selection, incomplete models may be the only way to avoid misspecification. 
However, although Charles F. Manski (2007) and others have shown that incompleteness need 
not seriously reduce the econometric usefulness of decision-theoretic models, incompleteness 
                                                 
58 In some applications it is reasonable to assume that these idiosyncrasies are commonly known among the players, though not 
to the analyst; in others they are taken to be privately observed. 
59 Recall that in games that are not sufficiently dominance-solvable, k-rationalizability is incomplete in that it does not specify a 
unique (though probabilistic) prediction conditional on the value of the behavioral parameters; and that in games with multiple 
equilibria, equilibrium plus noise but without refinements is incomplete in the same general sense (Section 2).   61 
can have severe identification and estimation costs in game-theoretic models, where individual 
ambiguity can “multiply up” across players to yield much greater ambiguity. 
  Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) show, for example, that in two-person entry games, 
weakening equilibrium to k-rationalizability for low k implies much weaker identification of the 
distributions of players’ payoff perturbations, with individuals’ k’s often unidentified. In an 
extreme case, in complete-information entry games 1-rationalizability implies that even 
unlimited data can rule out only a tiny fraction of possible parameter values (their Figure 3).
60
  Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) also compare the identifying powers of equilibrium and 
k-rationalizability in first-price private-value auctions. Following Pierpaolo Battigalli and 
Marciano Siniscalchi (2003), they note that k-rationalizability implies only a weak upper bound 
on bids, which shrinks with k but allows bids both above and below equilibrium for any k. This 
ambiguity leads to weak bounds on bidders’ value distributions and limits their identifiability. 
 
  These analyses suggest that it may be helpful to complete k-rationalizability, and/or to model 
equilibrium selection, by postulating a structural level-k model with enough behavioral 
parameters to limit the risk of misspecification. k-rationalizability allows some beliefs that, 
though consistent with finitely iterated knowledge of rationality, are behaviorally outlandish 
(Section 2.2). Further, there is now a large body of experimental evidence that, to the extent that 
initial responses respect k-rationalizability, they do so because people follow level-k decision 
rules that respect it, not because they explicitly perform finitely iterated dominance (Section 3). 
Thus, the cost in descriptive accuracy of adding a level-k structure may be quite small. 
  The benefits of completing k-rationalizability or modeling equilibrium selection via a 
structural level-k model can be considerable. Benjamin Gillen (2010) studies a level-k model of 
private-value first-price auctions based on Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) (Section 5). He shows 
that under a reasonable but not unrestrictive assumption on the separation of level-k types’ 
bidding functions, and with enough variation in the number of bidders, both bidders’ value 
distributions and their types are identified, parametrically or nonparametrically. Thus Gillen’s 
                                                 
60 Costa-Gomes and Crawford’s (2006, footnote 42, p. 1766) makes a similar point, noting that in their maximum likelihood 
estimation of a model of subjects’ guesses and searches for hidden payoff information, the guess part of the log-likelihood is 
nearly six times larger than the search part. As they explain, this is because their theory makes precise predictions of a 
subject’s decisions, given his type; but their theory of cognition and search imposes only weak, set-valued restrictions on a 
subject’s searches, given his type. Because their theory of decisions is complete while their theory of search is incomplete, the 
search restrictions are much more likely to be satisfied by chance, which causes the disparity in likelihood weights.   62 
level-k model makes identification just as strong as it is assuming equilibrium, with the bonus 
that one can identify bidders’ level-k types as well.
61
  Another potential application revisits Ciliberto and Tamer’s (2009) analysis of airline entry 
decisions into U.S. markets. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Ciliberto and Tamer assume 
equilibrium but use an incomplete model that is agnostic about equilibrium selection. Even 
allowing for prediction ambiguity, their estimated model correctly predicts the entrants in a given 
market less than 35% of the time, with participants often coordinating better ex post than in any 
equilibrium. This feature of their analysis is strongly reminiscent of Kahneman’s “entry magic” 
(Section 6), which suggests that replacing their agnostic model of equilibrium selection with a 
level-k structure might complete the model in a way that yields more accurate predictions. 
  
 
9. Yushchenko and Lake Wobegon: 
Non-neutral Framing in Outguessing Games 
 
“Any government wanting to kill an opponent…would not try it at a meeting with 
government officials.” 
 
—comment, quoted in Chivers (2004), on the poisoning of Ukrainian presidential 
candidate—now ex-president—Viktor Yushchenko 
     
       
      “…in Lake Wobegon, the correct answer is usually ‘c’.” 
 
—Garrison Keillor (1997) on multiple-choice tests (quoted in Attali and Bar-Hillel 
(2003)  
 
  The Yushchenko and Lake Wobegon quotations refer to simultaneous-move zero-sum two-
person games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria. In the first, the players are an assassin 
choosing one of several dinners at which to try to poison Yuschenko, only one of which is with 
officials of the government suspected of wanting to poison him; and an investigator who has the 
resources to check only one of the dinners. In the second, the players are a test designer deciding 
where to hide the correct answer and a clueless test-taker trying to guess its hiding place.  
                                                 
61 This completion would not work in the same way with a CH model, because CH types do not always choose k-rationalizable 
strategies. Brendan Kline (2010) also studies the problems that arise in identifying and estimating econometric level-k/CH 
models. He gives conditions for large-sample identification and robustness of estimators to sampling variation when types' 
predicted behaviors are known and each agent makes only one choice, and parallel conditions for identification when types' 
predicted behaviors are unknown but each agent makes many choices.   63 
  In each case the key issue is how players react to framing of decisions that is psychologically 
non-neutral but does not directly affect payoffs. Equilibrium in zero-sum two-person games 
leaves no room for such framing to affect outcomes, but people often react to it anyway. The 
thinking reflected by the quotations is plainly strategic, but nonequilibrium: To the first, for 
example, any game theorist worth his salt would respond, “If that’s what people think, a meeting 
with government officials is exactly where I would try to poison Yushchenko.” 
9.1. Hide and Seek Experiments 
  Rubinstein and Tversky (“RT”; e.g. Rubinstein 1999) conducted experiments with zero-sum, 
two-person “hide-and-seek” games with non-neutral framing of locations. A typical seeker’s 
instructions were: “Your opponent has hidden a prize in one of four boxes arranged in a row. 
The boxes are marked as shown below: A, B, A, A. Your goal is, of course, to find the prize. His 
goal is that you will not find it. You are allowed to open only one box. Which box are you going 
to open?” A hider’s instructions were analogous.  
  RT’s design is important as a tractable abstract model of a non-neutral cultural or geographic 
frame, or “landscape.” The frame has no direct payoff consequences; all that matters is whether 
or not the hider finds the seeker, not where. But the frame is non-neutral in two ways: The “B” 
location is distinguished by its label, and the two “end A” locations may be inherently focal. This 
gives the “central A” location its own brand of uniqueness as the “least salient” location.
62
  Traditional game theory rules out any influence of the landscape by fiat, and RT’s hide-and-
seek game has a clear equilibrium prediction, which leaves no room for framing to influence the 
outcome. Moreover, the rationale for playing one’s equilibrium strategy is immune to most of 
the usual counterarguments in a zero-sum two-person game. Even so, framing had a strong and 
systematic effect in RT’s experiments, qualitatively the same in six experiments around the 
world, with Central A or its analogs in other treatments most prevalent for hiders (37% in the 
 In our 
quotations, Yuschenko’s meeting with government officials is analogous to RT’s B location, and 
the physiology of poison may have created something like RT’s end locations. Although there is 
nothing as uniquely salient in Lake Wobegon as the dinner with government officials, 
psychologists think that with four possible answers, both the a and d end locations and location c 
are inherently salient (with the jury still out on which is more salient; see Christenfeld, 1995). 
                                                 
62 Mathematically this “negative” uniqueness is analogous to the “positive” uniqueness of “B”, but Crawford and Iriberri’s 
(2007b) analysis shows that its psychological effects are quite different.   64 
aggregate) and Central A even more prevalent for seekers (46%).
63
  RT took the nonequilibrium patterns in their data as evidence that their subjects did not think 
strategically (see the quotations in Crawford and Iriberri 2007b, p. 1733, footnote 3). But as 
Crawford and Iriberri argued, responses to such simple games are unlikely to be completely non-
strategic and the fact that subjects’ patterns of behavior were qualitatively the same in six 
experiments suggests that they have a common structure, even if it is a nonequilibrium one.  
 These results pose two 
puzzles. On average hiders are as smart as seekers, so hiders tempted to hide in central A should 
realize that seekers will be just as tempted to look there. Why do hiders allow seekers to find 
them 32% of the time when they could hold it down to 25% via the equilibrium mixed strategy? 
And why do seekers choose central A (or its analogs) even more often (46%) than hiders (37%)?  
  What kind of model can explain the main patterns in the data? First, although the payoff 
structure of RT’s game is asymmetric, all models that focus on payoffs to the exclusion of 
labeling—equilibrium, QRE, and level-k with a uniform random L0—imply role-symmetric 
responses (QRE here coincides with equilibrium, for any distribution and precision) and so miss 
the strong role-asymmetric patterns in the results. 
  Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) accordingly compared versions of equilibrium, QRE, and 
level-k/CH models that all incorporate the effects of labeling— for equilibrium or QRE, by 
adding payoff perturbations that plausibly describe hiders’ and seekers’ instinctive reactions to 
salience (seekers get extra payoff credit for salient locations, hiders lose credit); and for level-k, 
by making L0 role-independent but probabilistically favoring salient locations. 
  In particular, Crawford and Iriberri (2007b, online appendix) found that LQRE and 
equilibrium with payoff perturbations both miss the strong role-asymmetric patterns in the 
results; and that LQRE with estimated perturbations either gets the main patterns qualitatively 
wrong or estimates an infinite precision and thereby turns itself back into an equilibrium with 
payoff perturbations model, which itself fits significantly less well than a level-k model. 
  By contrast, a level-k/CH model responds to the role-asymmetric payoff structure in a role-
asymmetric way, and a level-k model with a role-independent L0 that probabilistically favors 
                                                 
63 This statement depends on identifying analogies among RT’s treatments as explained in Crawford and Iriberri (2007b, Section 
1). One might argue that because any strategy, pure or mixed, is a best response to equilibrium beliefs, deviations do not 
violate the theory. But systematic deviations from equilibrium choice frequencies must (with high probability) have a cause 
that is partly common across players. They are therefore symptomatic of systematic deviations from equilibrium probabilities.   65 
salient locations can gracefully explain RT’s results.
64 Assume that L0 hiders and seekers both 
choose A, B, A, A with probabilities p/2, q, 1– p – q, p/2 respectively, with p > ½ and q > ¼, so 
that L0 favors both the end locations and the B location equally for hiders and seekers. Then for 
behaviorally plausible type distributions (estimated 0% L0, 19% L1, 32% L2, 24% L3, 25% L4—
almost hump-shaped), a level-k model explains the prevalence of central A for hiders and its 
even greater prevalence for seekers. Given L0’s attraction to salient locations, L1 hiders choose 
central A to avoid L0 seekers and L1 seekers avoid central A searching for L0 hiders (the data 
suggest that end locations are more salient than B). For similar reasons, L2 hiders choose central 
A with probability between 0 and 1 (breaking payoff ties randomly) and L2 seekers choose it 
with probability 1. L3 hiders avoid central A and L3 seekers choose it with probability between 
zero and one (breaking payoff ties randomly). L4 hiders and seekers both avoid central A.
65
  Note that only a heterogeneous population with substantial frequencies of L2 and L3 as well 
as L1 (estimated 0% L0, 19% L1, 32% L2, 24% L3, 25% L4) can reproduce the aggregate 
patterns in the data. Crawford and Iriberri estimate that the salience of an end location is greater 
than that of the B location (p > 2q). Given this, a 50-50 mix of L1s and L2s in both player roles 
would imply (their Table 2) 75% of hiders but only 50% of seekers choosing central A, in 
contrast to the 37% of hiders and 46% of seekers who did choose central A. 
 The 
role asymmetry in aggregate behavior follows naturally from the asymmetry of the game’s 
payoff structure, via hiders’ and seekers’ asymmetric responses to L0’s role-symmetric choices. 
  Crawford and Iriberri’s analysis suggests that RT’s subjects were quite strategic and in fact 
more than usually sophisticated (with many L3s and even some L4s, even though in most 
settings L1s and L2s are more common)—they just didn’t follow equilibrium logic. Their 
analysis suggests that the Yushchenko quotation is not unusually sophisticated: it reflects the 




  Although prior intuitions about the likely hump shape and location of the type distribution 
impose some discipline in specifying a level-k model, the freedom to specify L0 leaves room for 
                                                 
64 Defining L0 as uniform random would be unnatural, given that L0 describes others’ instinctive responses to the non-neutral 
framing of decisions. It would also make Lk coincide with Equilibrium for all k > 0. 
65 Even though there is a nonnegligible estimated frequency of L4s, they don’t really matter here because they never choose 
central A (Table 2 above), hence they are not implicated in the major aggregate patterns. For the same reason, their frequency 
is not well identified in the estimation. 
66 In a more detailed analysis of Burchardi and Penczynski’s (2010) data on these games, including their chat deliberations, 
Penczynski (2010) finds support for a level-k model, but one with role-asymmetric L0 and type distribution.     66 
doubts about overfitting and portability, the extent to which a model estimated from responses to 
one game can be extended to predict or explain responses to different games. Crawford and 
Iriberri (2007b) tested for overfitting, and found that the test also favored their level-k model. 
But here we focus on their test for portability, which has instructive general implications. 
  Crawford and Iriberri compared the ability of the leading alternative models, when estimated 
from RT’s data, to “predict” subjects’ initial responses to the two closest relatives of RT’s games 
in the literature, Barry O’Neill’s (1987) famous card-matching game, and Amnon Rapoport and 
Richard B. Boebel’s (1992) closely related game. These games both raise the same strategic 
issues as RT’s games, but with more complex patterns of wins and losses, different framing, and 
in the latter case five locations. Here we discuss only O’Neill’s game, in which players 
simultaneously choose one of four cards: A, 2, 3, J. One player wins if there is a match on J or a 
mismatch on A, 2, or 3; otherwise the other wins. The game is thus like hide-and-seek, but with 
each player a hider for some locations and a seeker for others.  
  There is a uniquely natural way to adapt Crawford and Iriberri’s L0 specification from RT’s 
hide-and-seek games to O’Neill’s game: A and J, “face” cards and end locations, are more 
salient than 2 and 3, but either A or J could be more salient. Although this specification appears 
to add two degrees of freedom, because all that matters about L0 is what it makes L1s do in each 
player role, effectively it adds only a single discrete choice between two alternative models. 
  This specification also illustrates an important point: Because L0 is “only” a psychological 
issue, it is easy to gather evidence on it from different settings, and such evidence is more likely 
to yield consensus on a general definition of L0 than if it were combined with strategic issues. 
  It may appear that the flexibility of the type frequencies gives level-k models considerable 
freedom to overfit the data, but empirically plausible frequencies often imply severe limits on 
what decision patterns a level-k model can generate. Discussions of O’Neill’s data, for example 
by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), have been dominated by an “Ace effect”: Aggregated over all 
105 rounds, row and column players played A with frequencies 22.0% and 22.6%, slightly but 
significantly above the equilibrium 20%. Yet no plausible level-k model can make a row player 
play A more than the equilibrium 20%.
67
                                                 
67 Crawford and Iriberri’s (2007b, online appendix) Tables A3 and A4 show that, excluding L0s (which normally have 0 
estimated frequencies) and restricting attention to row players (Player 1s), when A is more salient (3j – a < 1) only L4 chooses 
A, and that with probability at most 1/3 (Table A3); and that when A is less salient (3j – a > 1) only L3 chooses A, and that 
 Thus, despite the apparent flexibility, the level-k 
model’s structure and the principles that guide the specification of L0 imply a strong restriction.   67 
  Crawford and Iriberri did not have O’Neill’s data before they carried out their portability 
test; but based on the success of the level-k model in explaining RT’s results, they speculated 
that O’Neill’s subjects’ initial responses must not have had an Ace effect. In fact for initial 
responses there was no Ace effect: only a Joker effect, a full order of magnitude stronger, in 
which rows played J 56% of the time and columns played it 64% of the time. 
  Unlike the putative Ace effect, this Joker effect and the other observed frequencies can be 
gracefully explained by a level-k model with an L0 that probabilistically favors the salient A and 
J cards, in the spirit of Crawford and Iriberri’s analysis of RT’s data.
68
  Importantly, the analysis traces the superior portability of the level-k model to the fact that 
L0 is psychological rather than strategic, and that it is based on simple and universal intuition 
and evidence. If L0 were strategic, it would interact with the strategic structure in new ways in 
each new game, and it would be a rare event when one could extrapolate a specification from 
one game to another. Thus, the definition of L0 as an instinctive, nonstrategic response is more 
that a convenient cognitive categorization: it is important for portability. 
 By contrast, equilibrium 
or LQRE with payoff perturbations are well-defined for O’Neill’s game, but they both fit 
significantly worse than Crawford and Iriberri’s favored level-k model. 
 
10. Mr. Schelling Goes to Chicago: 
Coordination via Payoff Asymmetries and Non-neutral Framing 
  Perhaps the most famous examples of framing effects in economics are Schelling’s (1960) 
classic “meeting in New York City” experiments. Crawford, Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich 
(2008) randomly paired subjects to play games with commonly observed, non-neutral decision 
labels like Schelling’s, but except for a game with the payoff symmetry of Schelling’s games, 
they used payoff-asymmetric games like Battle of the Sexes. 
  In unpaid pilots run in Chicago, Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich used naturally 
occurring labels, pitting the world-famous Sears Tower versus the little-known AT&T Building 
across the street. The salience of Sears Tower makes it easy and, in principle, obvious for 
subjects to coordinate on the “both-Sears” equilibrium; and they almost all do this in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
with probability at most 1/3 (Table A4). This is logically possible, but in the first case it would require a population of 60% or 
more L4s, and in the second case it would require 60% or more L3s: in each case behaviorally extremely unlikely. 
68 Thus, although O’Neill speculated that the Ace effect in the time-aggregated data occurred because “…players were attracted 
by the powerful connotations of an Ace” the analysis suggests that it was an accidental by-product of how subjects learned.   68 
symmetric version of the game. Since Schelling’s experiments with symmetric games, people 
have assumed that slight payoff asymmetry would not interfere with this. However, even with 
slight payoff asymmetry, the game poses a new strategic problem because both-Sears is one 
player’s favorite way to coordinate but not the other player’s. Just as in a society of men and 
women playing Battle of the Sexes, in which Ballet is more salient than Fights, there is a tension 
between the “label salience” of Sears and the “payoff-salience” of a player’s favorite way to 
coordinate: Payoff salience reinforces label salience in one player role (P2s) but opposes it for 
players in the other (P1s). This tension may lead players to respond asymmetrically, which in 
this game is bad for coordination. 
  As Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich suspected, although the Chicago Skyscrapers results 
replicated Schelling’s results in the symmetric version of the game, there was a substantial 
decline in coordination with even slight payoff asymmetry (Figure 6). To investigate the reasons 
for the decline, they conducted more formal, paid treatments using abstract decision labels, 
pitting X against Y, with X presumed (and shown) to be more salient than Y. Like the salience of 
Sears Tower, the salience of the X label makes coordinating on the “both-X” equilibrium the 
obvious thing to do; and subjects do coordinate on “both-X” in the symmetric version of the 
game. But payoff asymmetry again introduces a tension between the “label salience” of X and 
the “payoff-salience” of a player’s favorite way to coordinate, which reinforces label salience for 
P2s but opposes it for P1s. This tension again had a large and surprising effect (Figure 7). 
  Even tiny payoff asymmetries caused a large drop in the expected coordination rate, from 
64% (0.64 = 0.76×0.76 + 0.24×0.24) in the symmetric game to 38%, 46%, and 47% in the 
asymmetric games. Perhaps more surprisingly (and unlike in the unpaid Chicago Skyscrapers 
treatment), the pattern of miscoordination reversed as asymmetric games progressed from small 
to large payoff differences: With slightly asymmetric payoffs, most subjects in both roles 
favored their partners’ payoff-salient decisions. But with moderate or large asymmetries, most 
subjects in both roles switched to favoring their own payoff-salient decisions.  
  There are two things to explain here: Why didn’t subjects in the asymmetric games ignore 
the payoff asymmetry, which cannot be used to break the symmetry as required for coordination, 
and use the salience of Sears Tower to coordinate? Why did the pattern of miscoordination 
reverse as the asymmetric games progressed from small to large payoff differences? Standard 

































    P2 (90% Sears) 
    Sears  AT&T 
P1 (90% Sears)  Sears  100,100  0,0 
AT&T  0,0  100,100 
Symmetric 
 
    P2 (58% Sears) 
    Sears  AT&T 
P1 (61% Sears)  Sears  100,101  0,0 
AT&T  0,0  101,100 
Slight Asymmetry 
 
    P2 (47% Sears) 
    Sears  AT&T 
P1 (50% Sears)  Sears  100,110  0,0 
AT&T  0,0  110,100 
Moderate Asymmetry 
Figure 6. Chicago Skyscrapers 
 
    P2 (76% X) 
    X  Y 
P1 (76% X)  X  5,5  0,0 
Y  0,0  5,5 
Symmetric 
      P2 (28% X) 
    X  Y 
P1 (78% X)  X  5,5.1  0,0 
Y  0,0  5.1,5 
Slight Asymmetry 
      P2 (61% X) 
    X  Y 
P1 (33% X)  X  5,6  0,0 
Y  0,0  6,5 
Moderate Asymmetry 
      P2 (60% X) 
    X  Y 
P1 (36% X)  X  5,10  0,0 
Y  0,0  10,5 
Large Asymmetry 
Figure 7. X-Y Treatments   70 
  A level-k model can gracefully explain the patterns in the data, but again it’s important to 
have an L0 that realistically describes people’s beliefs about others’ instinctive reactions to the 
tension between label- and payoff-salience that seems to drive the results. Assume that L0 is the 
same in both player roles, and that it responds instinctively to both label and payoff salience; but 
with a “payoffs bias” that favors payoff over label salience, other things equal: In symmetric 
games L0 chooses X with some probability greater than ½. And in any asymmetric game, (for 
simplicity only) whether or not label-salience opposes payoff-salience, L0 chooses its payoff-
salient decision with probability p > ½.
69
  Under these assumptions, L1’s and L2’s choices in roles P1 and P2 are determined by p, the 
extent of L0’s payoff bias. Except in symmetric games, even though L0’s choice probabilities are 
the same for P1s and P2s, they imply L1 and L2 choice probabilities that differ across player 
roles due to the asymmetric relationships between label and payoff salience for P1s and P2s. 
 
  Simple calculations show that a level-k model can track the reversal of the pattern of 
miscoordination between the slightly asymmetric game and those with moderate or large payoff 
asymmetries if (and only if) 0.505 (= 5.1/[5.1+5]) < p < 0.545 (= 6/[6+5]), so that L0 has only a 
modest payoff bias. If p falls into this range and the population frequency of L1 is 0.7 and that of 
L2 is 0.3, close to most previous estimates, the model’s predicted choice frequencies differ from 
the observed frequencies by more than 10% only in the symmetric game, where the model 
somewhat overstates the homogeneity of CGR’s subject pool because it predicts 100% play of X. 
  More work is needed in this area, particularly with regard to the precise specification of L0 
and the interaction between level-k/CH thinking and “team reasoning”, in which players do what 
would be best for both or all, if both or all did it (Nicholas Bardsley, Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer 
and Robert Sugden 2010). The full explanation will plainly have a level-k/CH component, but 
more work is needed to see how it interacts with team reasoning.       
  
                                                 
69 These assumptions are consistent with Crawford and Iriberri’s (2007b) assumptions, because their games had no payoff-
salience. However, there remain some unresolved issues about how to generalize these assumptions.    71 
11. Huarangdao and D-Day:  
Communication of Intentions in Outguessing Games 
“Have you forgotten the tactic of ‘letting weak points look weak and strong points look 
strong’?” 
   
      — General Kongming, in Luo Guanzhong’s historical novel, Three Kingdoms.  
 
 
“Don’t you know what the military texts say? ‘A show of force is best where you are 
weak. Where strong, feign weakness.’” 
 




   
  "Lord, what fools these mortals be!" 
    —Puck, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act 3 
 
    In the Huarongdao story, set around 200 A.D., fleeing General Cao Cao, trying to avoid 
capture by pursuing General Kongming, chose between two escape routes, the easier Main Road 
and the awful Huarong Road (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Red_Cliffs). Thus the game 
closely resembles Far Pavilions Escape (Section 4). But there is an added wrinkle: Before Cao 
Cao’s choice Kongming had an opportunity to send a message by lighting campfires along one 
of the roads. This message had an obvious literal meaning, but it was scarcely more costly to 
send a false message than a true one: The message was approximately cheap talk. Kongming, 
having sent his message before Cao Cao’s choice, then chose which road to wait in ambush on. 
  In the event Kongming lit his campfires along the Huarong Road and waited in ambush 
there, sending a deceptively truthful message. Cao Cao, misjudging the extent of Kongming’s 
deviousness, inverted the message, took the Huarong Road, and was caught. 
  Huarongdao closely resembles the organizing example in Crawford’s (2003) level-k analysis 
of deceptive preplay communication, Operation Fortitude South, the Allies’ attempt to deceive 
the Germans regarding where they planned to invade Europe on D-Day (6 June 1944; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Fortitude; see also Ken Hendricks and R. Preston 
McAfee, 2006). As in Huarongdao, the Allies’ message was approximately cheap talk and the 
                                                 
70 Evidently Cao Cao had bought a used, out-of-date edition! Thanks to Duozhe Li for the reference.    72 
underlying game was an outguessing game with conflicting interests; but in this case made zero-
sum to sharpen the point.
71
  In the event the Allies faked preparations for invasion at Calais, sending a deceptively 
deceptive message. The Germans, misjudging the extent of the Allies’ deviousness, defended 
Calais and left Normandy lightly defended; and the Allies then invaded Normandy. 
 There were two possible attack or defense locations, Calais and 
Normandy. The greater ease of crossing to Calais is reflected in the payoff assumptions, which 
imply that attacking an undefended Calais is better for the Allies than attacking an undefended 
Normandy, hence better for the Allies if the Germans are equally likely to defend each place; and 
that defending an unattacked Normandy is worse for the Germans than defending an unattacked 
Calais, hence worse for the Germans if the Allies are equally likely to attack each place. 
  In each case the key strategic issue is how the sender—Kongming or the Allies—should 
choose his message and how the receiver—Cao Cao or the Germans—should interpret it, 
knowing that the sender is thinking about the message from the same point of view.  
  Moreover, in each case essentially the same thing happened: In D-Day the message was 
literally deceptive but the Germans were fooled because they “believed” it—either because they 
were credulous or because they inverted the message one too many times. Kongming’s message 
was literally truthful but Cao Cao was fooled because he inverted it. Although the sender’s and 
receiver’s message strategies and beliefs were different, the outcome in the underlying game was 
the same: The sender won, but in the less beneficial of the two possible ways. Why did the 
receiver allow himself to be fooled by a costless (hence easily faked) message from an enemy? 
And if the sender expected his message to fool the receiver, why didn’t he reverse it and fool the 
receiver in the way that would allow him to win in the more beneficial way? 
  Equilibrium analysis does not help to explain these puzzles. In real interactions with preplay 
communication, a receiver’s thinking often assigns a prominent role to the literal meanings of 
messages, without necessarily taking them at face value. Yet equilibrium analysis precludes a 
role for the literal meanings of cheap-talk messages.
72
                                                 
71 The game differs from Huarongdao in the relation between payoffs and labeling, in that both Cao Cao and Kongming prefer 
the Main Road, holding the probability of being outguessed equal; while the Allies and the German have opposing preferences 
about where the invasion takes place, holding the probability of being outguessed equal. But the analysis will show that in a 
level-k analysis, as in a traditional analysis, this difference is inessential. In a traditional analysis any effect of labeling is ruled 
out by fiat. We have seen in Section 9 that labels may matter in a level-k analysis, but here their effect is overridden by the fact 
that in communication games, L0 is anchored in truthfulness, and communication overrides the effects of labeling. 
 Further, in real interactions the sender’s 
message and action are part of a single, integrated strategy: He tries to anticipate which message 
72 But see Joseph Farrell (1993), whose notion of neologism-proofness sometimes allows literal meanings influence, but not here.   73 
will fool the receiver, and his action may differ from the one he would have chosen with no 
opportunity to send a deceptive message. Yet with conflicting interests there is no equilibrium 
(refined or not) in which cheap talk conveys information or the receiver responds to the message. 
In such an equilibrium, if the receiver found it optimal to respond to the message, the response 
would help the receiver and therefore hurt the sender, who would then prefer to make his 
message uninformative (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Thus communication can have no effect, 
and the underlying game must be played according to its unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
  As the quotations from Kongming and Cao Cao suggest, these puzzles can be resolved via a 
level-k analysis, as in Crawford (2003). In specifying L0 for games with communication, a 
uniform random L0 seems quite unnatural. For sender or receiver, the instinctive reaction to a 
message in a language one understands is surely to focus on its literal meaning, even if one ends 
up lying or not taking the message at face value. Accordingly, Crawford (2003, Table 1, but with 
the types renamed and renumbered here to conform more closely to later usage) assumed that 
players anchor their beliefs in truthful literal meanings, with an L0 sender telling the truth and an 
L0 receiver credulously believing whatever he is told.
73 Given this, iterating best responses as in 
other level-k models: an L1 receiver believes what he is told; an L1 sender lies; an L2 receiver 
inverts what he is told; an L2 sender lies; an L3 receiver inverts; an L3 sender tells the truth 
(anticipating an L2 receiver’s inversion); and so on. Thus it appears that Cao Cao was L2, while 
Kongming was L3. Similarly, it appears that the Allies were L2, while the Germans were L1, or 
perhaps (inverting one too many times) L4.
74
  If there is no omniscient narrator telling us how the players are thinking, we can create an 
outcome table as in our analyses of Far Pavilions Escape (Section 4) or Entry Magic (Section 6), 
and combine it with an estimate of the type distribution to generate a statistical prediction of the 
outcome. The model’s implications then follow mechanically from estimates of the frequencies 
of sender types who tell the truth, or lie; and of receiver types who believe, or invert messages. 
In such settings, trivially, receivers sometimes misread senders’ messages and are deceived. 
    
                                                 
73 The literature has not converged on how types should be numbered, or on whether L0 receivers should be defined as credulous 
or as uniform random—compare Ellingsen and Östling (2010)—but the issue is partly semantic because truthful L0 senders 
imply credulous L1 receivers. Here we take L0 receivers to be credulous; and given this, we define Lk in either player role as 
the type that iterates best responses k times. Note that unlike in equilibrium cheap-talk analyses where the meaning of 
messages is determined endogeneously (Crawford and Sobel 1982), the definition of L0 resolves that indeterminacy. 
74 As this last possibility illustrates, in a level-k model, unlike a CH model, it can be just as costly to be too clever as to be not 
clever enough, which we view as a realistic feature of level-k models.     74 
  It is more interesting and potentially more useful to ask what happens if some participants 
follow level-k decision rules, but others (like Costa-Gomes et al.’s 2001 and Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford’s 2006 Sophisticated type) understand both game theory and how real people think 
about strategy better than any mechanical rule. Although Sophisticated subjects are rare in 
experiments, we presume they are more common in field settings. And despite the occurrence of 
deception in the analysis with only level-k types, it is far from clear that a Sophisticated sender 
can deceive a Sophisticated receiver in the presence of level-k types. Aside from shedding 
additional light on strategic communication, such an analysis might yield a deeper understanding 
of settings such as financial markets with some experienced participants, where the standard 
distinction between rational and “noise” traders seems oversimplified as a model of people’s 
reactions to news (compare Section 3’s Graham quotation). 
  We discuss this extension in the context of Crawford’s (2003) analysis of strategic 
communication, but see also Ricardo Serrano-Padial’s (2010) innovative analysis of the 
interaction between naïve and sophisticated traders in prediction and other speculative markets. 
We also continue to restrict attention to novel situations, so that experience can teach people to 
predict other people’s general behavior patterns, but not their specific strategies. 
  Crawford (2003) assumed that with positive probabilities, each player role is filled either by 
one of the various possible kinds of level-k types, for which his generic term was Mortal types 
(following Puck); or by a Sophisticated type. As suggested by experimental evidence from other 
kinds of games, he assumed the frequencies of L0 senders and receivers are zero. As also 
suggested by the evidence, higher-level Mortal types avoid fixed-point reasoning (recall footnote 
7’s quotation), and instead use step-by-step procedures, which normally determine unique pure 
strategies. Sophisticated types, by contrast, know everything about the game, including the 
distribution of Mortal types; and are capable of fixed-point reasoning.  
  The perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game between possibly Mortal or Sophisticated 
senders and receivers can be characterized as follows. Given L0, Mortal players’ strategies are 
determined mechanically and independently of each other’s and Sophisticated players’ strategies. 
They can therefore be treated as exogenous, even though they affect others’ payoffs. We can 
then plug in the distributions of Mortal senders’ and receivers’ strategies to obtain a “reduced 
game” between possible Sophisticated senders and receivers, taking Mortals’ strategies as given.    75 
  Because Sophisticated players’ payoffs are influenced by Mortal players’ decisions, the 
reduced game is no longer zero-sum, its messages are no longer cheap talk, and it no longer has 
complete information. The sender’s message, ostensibly about his intentions, is in fact read by a 
Sophisticated receiver as a signal of the sender’s type. Thus, the possibility of Mortal players 
completely changes the character of the game between Sophisticated players, which is what 
gives the model the ability to explain the effectiveness of communication in a zero-sum game 
and the possibility of deception between Sophisticated players.   
  In the equilibrium, Mortal (non-L0) senders’ simplified models of others always make them 
expect to fool receivers, which depending on the sender’s type (via whether he believes his 
message will be believed or inverted) he thinks he can do either by lying (as the Allies did) or by 
telling the truth (as Kongming did). Accordingly, each Mortal sender type sends the message 
that it expects to maximize the gain from fooling receivers, and then chooses the corresponding 
strategy in the underlying game. For example, a Mortal Allied type sends the message it expects 
to make the Germans think it will attack Normandy, and then attacks Calais. 
  Given this, the equilibria of the reduced game are determined by the population frequencies 
of Mortal and Sophisticated senders and receivers. When Sophisticated senders and receivers are 
common—not the most plausible case—the reduced game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium 
whose outcome duplicates that of the game without communication. In this equilibrium, 
Sophisticated senders’ and receivers’ mixed strategies offset Mortal senders’ and receivers’ 
deviations from equilibrium, and so eliminate Sophisticated senders’ gains from fooling Mortal 
receivers, so that Sophisticated and Mortal players in each role have equal expected payoffs.  
  By contrast, when Sophisticated senders and receivers are rare—the plausible case, judging 
by experimental evidence—the game has an essentially unique pure-strategy equilibrium. In this 
equilibrium, Sophisticated senders can predict Sophisticated receivers’ strategies perfectly, and 
vice versa. Speaking for concreteness of D-Day, Sophisticated Germans always defend Calais 
because they know that Mortal Allied types, who predominate when Sophisticated Allies are 
rare, will all attack Calais. Sophisticated Allies, knowing that they cannot affect the behavior of 
Sophisticated Germans, send the message that fools the most frequent type of Mortal German 
(feinting at Calais or Normandy depending on whether more Mortal Germans believe than invert 
messages) and then attack Normandy. Thus the model explains why Sophisticated Germans   76 
might allow themselves to be “fooled” by a costless message from Sophisticated Allies: It is an 
unavoidable cost of exploiting the mistakes of Mortal Allies, who are more common. 
  Surprisingly, there never exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which Sophisticated Allies 
feint at Normandy and then attack Calais. In such an equilibrium, any deviation from 
Sophisticated Allies’ equilibrium message would lead Sophisticated Germans to infer that the 
Allies were Mortal, making it optimal for Sophisticated Germans to defend Calais and 
suboptimal for Sophisticated Allies to attack there. If, in the equilibrium, Sophisticated Allies 
feinted at Normandy and attacked Calais, then their message would fool only the most likely 
kind of Mortal German— in a pure-strategy equilibrium Sophisticated Germans can never be 
fooled, and a given message cannot fool both Mortal German believers and inverters—with 
expected payoff gain equal to the frequency of the most frequent Mortal German type times the 
payoff of attacking an undefended Normandy. But such Sophisticated Allies could reverse both 
their message and attack location, again fooling the most frequent Mortal German type, but now 
with expected payoff gain equal to the frequency of that type times the payoff of attacking an 
undefended Calais, which is higher than the payoff of attacking an undefended Normandy. This 
contradiction shows that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, Sophisticated Allies must feint at 
Calais and then attack Normandy. 
  Thus, in the pure-strategy equilibrium that exists when Sophisticated players are rare, the 
model explains why, in both of our examples, the sender won but in the less beneficial of the two 
possible ways. The sender’s message and decision are part of a single, integrated strategy; and 
the decision to seek a win in the less beneficial way has much higher probability than if no 
communication was possible.  
  Nonetheless, Sophisticated players in either role do strictly better than their Mortal 
counterparts. Their payoff advantage comes from the ability to avoid being fooled and/or to 
choose which Mortal type(s) to fool. This suggests that in an adaptive analysis of the dynamics 
of the type distribution, the frequencies of Sophisticated types will grow until the population is in 
or near the region of mixed-strategy equilibria in which types’ expected payoffs are equal. Thus, 
somewhat surprisingly, Sophisticated and Mortal players can coexist in long-run equilibrium. 
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12. Alphonse and Gaston:  




Figure 8. Alphonse and Gaston 
     
—Frederick B. Opper’s comic strip, Alphonse and Gaston 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphonse_and_Gaston) 
   
  If level-k models allow preplay communication of intentions to affect the outcomes of zero-
sum two-person games, it is no surprise that they also allow effective communication in 
coordination games. Here the stylized experimental facts (Crawford 1998) are that when 
coordination requires symmetry-breaking (Section 6), one-sided communication is more 
effective; that when coordination requires assurance (Section 7), two-sided communication is 
more effective; and that when coordination requires symmetry-breaking and communication is 
two-sided, more communication is better than less. In this section we consider level-k/CH 
explanations that have been proposed for these facts. In each case the power of the analysis 
stems from the use of a model that does not assume equilibrium, but which imposes a realistic 
structure less agnostic than rationalizability or k-rationalizability. 
12.A. Coordination via One Round of Communication 
  Tore Ellingsen and Robert Östling (2010) adapt Crawford’s (2003) level-k analysis to study 
the effectiveness of a single round of one- or two-sided preplay communication in games where 
communication of intentions plays various roles.  
Here the central puzzle turns on Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin’s (1996) distinction 
between messages that are self-committing in the sense that if the message convinces the 
receiver, it’s a best response for the sender to do as he said he would do, and those that are self-  78 
signaling, in that they are sent when, and only when, the sender intends to behave accordingly. 
For example, in a two-person Stag Hunt game each player, without regard to his own intentions, 
does (weakly) better if his partner chooses high effort, so the message “I intend to play High 
Effort” is self-committing but not self-signaling. Robert J. Aumann (1990) argued on this basis 
that such messages are not credible. But Gary Charness (2000) and others have shown 
experimentally that messages that are self-committing but not self-signaling are quite effective in 
practice (but see Kenneth Clark, Stephen Kay, and Martin Sefton 2001). Theoretical 
explanations for this effectiveness have been elusive.   
Ellingsen and Östling’s (2010) analysis makes significant progress explaining this and other 
puzzles. Importantly, they depart from Crawford’s (2003) analysis by assuming that L0 receivers 
are uniform random rather than credulous and that all types have a preference for honesty when 
they are otherwise indifferent about which message to send. They show that in their model, one-
sided communication solves the coordination problem in games like Battle of the Sexes where it 
requires symmetry-breaking, and is therefore more effective than two-sided communication, as is 
usually found in experiments. They also show that their model can explain why two-sided 
communication is more effective than one-sided communication in games where coordination 
requires assurance as it does in Stag Hunt, as is also found in experiments. More generally, they 
show that in common interest games when both players are L2 or higher, either one- or two-way 
communication assures efficient coordination. But this tendency is far from universal: In some 
games players have incentives to misrepresent that erode coordination.  
12.B. Coordination via Multiple Rounds of Communication 
  Crawford (2007) reconsiders Farrell’s (1987) and Rabin’s (1994) analyses of the 
effectiveness of one or more rounds of simultaneous, two-sided cheap-talk messages about 
players’ intentions. Farrell’s and Rabin’s analyses assume equilibrium, sometimes weakened to 
rationalizability; and they further restrict attention to outcomes that satisfy plausible behavioral 
restrictions defining which combinations of messages create agreements, and whether and how 
agreements can be changed. Within this framework they address two conjectures regarding 
complete-information games: that preplay communication will yield an effective agreement to 
play an equilibrium in the underlying game; and that the agreed-upon equilibrium will be Pareto-
efficient within that game’s set of equilibria (henceforth “efficient”). They show that 
rationalizable preplay communication need not assure equilibrium; and that, although   79 
communication enhances coordination, even equilibrium with “abundant” (Rabin’s term for 
“unlimited”) communication does not assure that the outcome will be Pareto-efficient. 
  More specifically, Farrell (1987) uses Battle of the Sexes to study symmetry-breaking via 
one or more rounds of two-sided preplay communication with conflicting preferences about how 
to coordinate. He focuses on the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the entire game, 
including the communication phase, in which the first pair of messages in the same 
communication round that identify a pure-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes are treated 
as an agreement to play that equilibrium, ignoring all previous messages. He calculates the 
equilibrium rate of efficient coordination with one or more rounds of communication, showing 
that the rate increases steadily with the number of rounds but converges to a limit less than one 
even with abundant communication. Rabin (1994) extends Farrell’s analysis to a wide class of 
underlying games while dropping Farrell’s symmetry restriction; augmenting Farrell’s 
restrictions on how players use language to allow them to make interim agreements, which can 
be improved upon in subsequent agreements; and considering the implications of 
rationalizability as well as equilibrium. Rabin defines notions called negotiated equilibrium and 
negotiated rationalizability that combine the standard notions with his restrictions on how 
players use language. He shows that with abundant communication, each player’s negotiated 
equilibrium expected payoff is at least as high as in his worst efficient equilibrium in the 
underlying game. He then shows, replacing negotiated equilibrium by negotiated 
rationalizability, that even without equilibrium, each player expects (perhaps incorrectly) a 
payoff at least as high as in his worst efficient equilibrium. 
  Despite Farrell’s and Rabin’s partly negative conclusions, the conjectures that preplay 
communication will yield an agreement to play an equilibrium in the underlying game, and that 
the agreed-upon equilibrium will be efficient within the set of equilibrium are still widely held. 
Further, although equilibrium and rationalizability are natural places to start in analyses like 
theirs, it is also natural to test their robustness by replacing equilibrium and rationalizability with 
a structural nonequilibrium model based on level-k thinking—thus making the analysis less 
agnostic than rationalizability, while relaxing equilibrium in a way that has empirical support.  
  Crawford (2007) adapts his 2003 level-k analysis of strategic communication of private 
information to study the effectiveness of multiple rounds of simultaneous, two-sided cheap-talk 
messages about intentions, focusing on Farrell’s analysis of Battle of the Sexes. His analysis   80 
partly supports Farrell’s and Rabin’s assumptions about how players use language, but suggests 
that their “agreements” do not reflect a full meeting of the minds. Instead they reflect either one 
player’s perceived credibility as a sender or the other’s perceived credulity as a receiver, never 
both at the same time. As a result, a level-k analysis may not fully support the assumptions about 
agreements in Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability. 
  A level-k analysis also yields very different conclusions about the effectiveness of one- or 
multi-round two-sided communication. A level-k analysis suggests that coordination rates in 
Battle of the Sexes will be largely independent of the difference in players’ preferences, while in 
Farrell’s equilibrium analysis coordination rates are highly sensitive to this difference. Further, 
with one round of communication, the level-k rate is well above the rate without communication, 
and is likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate with one round of communication unless 
preferences are very close. Finally, with abundant communication, the level-k coordination rate 
is likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate unless preferences are moderately close. The 
model’s predictions with abundant communication are consistent with Rabin’s bounds based on 
negotiated rationalizability, but their precision yields additional insight into the causes and 
consequences of breakdowns in negotiations. 
 
13. October Surprise: 
Communication of Private Information in Outguessing Games 
 
“…The news that day was the so-called ‘October Surprise’ broadcast by bin Laden. He 
hadn’t shown himself in nearly a year, but now, four days before the [2004 presidential] 
election, his spectral presence echoed into every American home. It was a surprisingly 
complete statement by the al Qaeda leader about his motivations, his actions, and his view of 
the current American landscape. He praised Allah and, through most of the eighteen minutes, 
attacked Bush,… At the end, he managed to be dismissive of Kerry, but it was an 
afterthought in his ‘anyone but Bush’ treatise…. 
Inside the CIA…the analysis moved on a different [than the presidential candidates’ public] 
track. They had spent years, as had a similar bin Laden unit at FBI, parsing each expressed 
word of the al Qaeda leader…. What they’d learned over nearly a decade is that bin Laden 
speaks only for strategic reasons…. Today’s conclusion: bin Laden’s message was clearly 
designed to help the President’s reelection.” 
 
    —Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, 2006, pp. 335-6 (quoted in Jazayerli 2008 
    http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/10/guest-column-will-bin-laden-strike.html).  
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13.1. October Surprise 
  The situation described in the quotation can plausibly be modeled as a zero-sum two-person 
game of incomplete information between bin Laden and a representative American voter. The 
American knows that he wants whichever candidate bin Laden doesn’t want, but only bin Laden 
knows which candidate he wants. Bin Laden has a one-sided opportunity to send a cheap talk 
message about what he wants and, talk being cheap, he will say whatever he believes is most 
likely to bring about his desired outcome. The key strategic issues are how bin Laden should 
relate his statement to what he really wants and how the American voter should interpret bin 
Laden’s statement, knowing that bin Laden is choosing his message strategically. 
  Once again, the literal meanings of messages are likely to play a prominent role in 
applications, but equilibrium analysis precludes such a role. By the argument given in Section 
11, there is again no equilibrium in which cheap talk conveys information, or in which the 
receiver responds to the sender’s message. 
  However, Crawford’s (2003) analysis is easily adapted to model the CIA’s conclusion that 
bin Laden’s verbal attack on George W. Bush was intended to aid Bush’s reelection. Consider a 
level-k model in which L0 is again anchored on truthfulness for the sender (bin Laden) and 
credulity for the receiver (American). An L0 or L1 American believes bin Laden’s message, and 
therefore votes for whichever candidate bin Laden attacks. An L0 bin Laden who wants Bush to 
win attacks Kerry, but an L1 (L2) bin Laden who wants Bush to win believes that “reverse 
psychology” will be effective, and so attacks Bush to induce L0 (L1) Americans to vote for him. 
Given bin Laden’s attack on Bush, an L0 or L1 American ends up voting for Bush, and an L2 
American ends up voting for Kerry. A Sophisticated bin Laden, recognizing that he cannot fool 
Sophisticated Americans, would choose his message to fool the most prevalent kind of Mortal 
American—believer or inverter—as in Crawford (2003). 
13.2. Experiments 
  Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010), building on the experiments of Hongbin Cai and Wang 
(2006), studied communication of private information via cheap talk in discretized versions of 
Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) sender-receiver games (see also Toshiji Kawagoe and Hirokazu 
Takizawa 2009). In Wang, Spezio, and Camerer’s design, the sender observes a state, S = 1, 2, 3, 
4, or 5; and sends a message, M = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The receiver then observes the message and 
chooses an action, A = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The receiver’s choice of A determines the welfare of both:   82 
The receiver’s ideal outcome is A = S and his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is 110 
– 20|S–A|
1.4; and the sender’s ideal outcome is A = S + b and his von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function is 110 – 20|S+b–A|
1.4. They varied the parameter representing the difference in 
preferences across treatments: b = 0, 1, or 2. 
  The key issue is how much information can be transmitted in a Bayesian equilibrium, and 
how the amount is influenced by the difference between the sender’s and the receiver’s 
preferences. Crawford and Sobel characterized the possible equilibrium relationships between 
sender’s observed S and receiver’s choice of A, which determines the informativeness of 
communication. They showed, for a class of models with continuous state and action spaces that 
generalizes Wang, Spezio, and Camerer’s examples (except for their discreteness), that all 
equilibria are “partition equilibria”, in which the sender partitions the set of states into 
contiguous groups and tells the receiver, in effect, only which group his observation lies in. 
Importantly, the receiver’s beliefs on hearing the sender’s message M are an unbiased—though 
noisy—estimate of S: In equilibrium there is no lying or deception, only intentional vagueness. 
  For any given difference in sender’s and receiver’s preferences (b), there is a range of 
equilibria, from a “babbling” equilibrium with one partition element to more informative 
equilibria that exist when b is small enough. Under reasonable assumptions there is a “most 
informative” equilibrium, which has the most partition elements and gives the receiver the 
highest ex ante (before the sender observes the state) expected payoff. As the preference 
difference decreases, the amount of information transmitted in the most informative equilibrium 
increases (measured by the correlation between S and A, or by the receiver’s expected payoff).  
  Previous experiments, summarized by Crawford (1998), have confirmed the key comparative 
statics result that closer preferences allow more informative information transmission, while at 
the same time revealing systematic deviations from equilibrium. The puzzle is then, why does 
the comparative statics result hold even though equilibrium fails? A natural conjecture is that the 
comparative statics result holds for a wider class of nonequilibrium models, hence is robust to 
deviations from equilibrium; this is strongly confirmed by Wang, Spezio, and Camerer’s results.        
  The unambiguous part of Crawford and Sobel’s characterization of equilibrium concerns the 
possible relationships between S and A. Because messages are “cheap talk”, with no direct effect 
on payoffs, there is nothing to tie down their meanings in equilibrium. As a result, any   83 
equilibrium relationship between S and A can be supported by any sufficiently rich language, 
with the meanings of messages determined by players’ equilibrium beliefs. 
  Behaviorally, however, in experiments with a clear correspondence between state and 
message, as here, or where communication is in a common natural language, the interpretations 
of messages are dictated by their literal meanings. Thus messages are always understood—even 
if not always believed. Wang, Spezio, and Camerer’s data analysis therefore fixes the meanings 
of senders’ messages at their literal values. Even with this restriction, when the sender’s and 
receiver’s preferences are close enough (b = 0 or 1), there are multiple equilibria. Wang Spezio, 
and Camerer’s analysis then focuses on the “most informative” equilibrium. 
  When b = 0, the most informative equilibrium has M = S and A = S: perfect truth-telling, 
credulity, and information transmission, as is intuitively plausible when the sender and receiver 
have identical preferences. When b = 2, the most informative equilibrium has senders sending a 
completely uninformative message M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for any value of S; and receivers ignoring 
it, hence choosing A = 3, which is optimal given their prior beliefs, for any value of M. (A 
babbling equilibrium also exists when b = 0 or 1, but then it is not the most informative 
equilibrium.) When b = 1, the most informative equilibrium has senders sending M = 1 when S = 
1 but M = {2, 3, 4, 5} when S = 2, 3, 4, or 5; and receivers choosing A = 1 when M = 1 and A = 3 
or 4 when M = {2, 3, 4, 5}.
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  When b = 0 sender subjects almost always set M = S and receivers almost always set A = M: 
The result is near the perfect information transmission predicted by the most informative 
equilibrium. As Wang , Spezio, and Camerer’s Figures 1-3 show, as b increases to 1 or 2, the 
amount of information transmitted decreases as predicted by Crawford and Sobel’s equilibrium 
comparative statics, but there are also systematic deviations from the most informative (or any) 
equilibrium, and lying and successful deception occur. Most senders exaggerate the truth, 
apparently trying to move receivers from receivers’ ideal action toward senders’ ideal action (or 
5, whichever is smaller). Even so, there is some information in senders’ messages, which are 
positively correlated with the state. Receivers are usually deceived to some extent.  
 In this case, the difference in preferences causes noisy information 
transmission even in the most informative equilibrium. 
                                                 
75 The sender’s message M = {2, 3, 4, 5} is the simplest way to implement the intentional vagueness of this partition equilibrium. 
Another way would be for the sender to randomize M uniformly on {2, 3, 4, 5} when S = 1.When b = 1, there’s another, more 
informative equilibrium, found by David Eil, in which Senders send M = {1, 2} when S = 1 or 2 but M = {3, 4, 5} when S = 3, 
4, or 5; and Receivers choose A = 2 when M = {1, 2} and A = 4 when M = {3, 4, 5}. But this equilibrium is not “robust”, in 
that Senders who observe S = 2 are indifferent between M = {1, 2} and M = {3, 4, 5}.   84 
Wang, Spezio, and Camerer propose a level-k explanation of these results, based on 
Crawford’s (2003) analysis (see also Navin Kartik, Marco Ottaviani, and Francesco Squintani 
2007). They anchor beliefs in a truthful sender L0, which sets M = S; and a credulous receiver L0 
(which also best responds to an L0 sender), setting A = M. L1 senders best respond to L0 
receivers by inflating their messages by b: M = S + b (up to M = 5), so that L0 receivers will 
choose S + b, yielding the sender’s ideal action given S. L1 receivers (as they define them; the 
numbering is only a convention) best respond to L1 senders (and not to L0 senders as in 
Crawford 2003) by discounting the message, normally setting A = M – b, yielding receivers’ 
ideal action given M = S + b of S. L2 senders best respond to L1 receivers by inflating their 
messages by 2b: M = S + 2b (up to M = 5), so that L1 receivers will set A = M – b = S + b, 
yielding senders’ ideal action given S. L2 receivers best respond to L2 senders by discounting the 
message, normally setting A = M – 2b, yielding receivers’ ideal action given M = S + 2b of S. 
Econometric estimation classifies 18% of 16 Sender subjects as L0, 25% as L1, 25% as L2, 14% 
as Sophisticated, and 18% as Equilibrium, broadly consistent with earlier results.
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13.3 Field Studies 
  
Ulrike Malmendier and Devin Shanthikumar (2007, 2009) discuss the interaction between 
stock analysts and traders. Analysts issue recommendations on individual stocks that range from 
“strong sell” and “sell” to “hold”, “buy”, and “strong buy”; and they also issue earnings forecast. 
In managing their portfolios, traders are presumed to use all the information available on the 
market, of which analysts’ recommendations are a major source. 
An analyst’s recommendation or forecast is like a message in a sender-receiver game 
(Section 13.2). Particularly when an analyst is affiliated with the underwriter of a particular 
stock, he has an incentive to distort such messages. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) find 
that analysts tend to bias their stock recommendations upward, the more so when they are 
affiliated with the underwriter of the stock. They also find two main patterns of responses to 
recommendations among receivers: Large investors tend to buy following “strong buy” 
recommendations, but not to sell following “hold” recommendations, thus discounting 
recommendations somewhat. Small traders, by contrast, are credulous enough to follow 
                                                 
76 Wang, Spezio, and Camerer focus on sender subjects because they, but not receiver subjects, were eye-tracked. For 
comparison, Cai and Wang (2006) in a closely related design classified 6% of senders and 9% of receivers as L0, 25% of 
senders and 9% of receivers as L1, 31% of senders and 34% of receivers as L2 or Equilibrium, and 13% of senders and 28% of 
receivers as Sophisticated. They also state that a logit agent QRE model fits their data well.   85 
recommendations almost literally. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2009) find somewhat 
different patterns of responses to earnings forecasts. Large investors tend to react strongly and in 
the direction suggested by forecast updates, without regard to whether the forecast came from an 
affiliated analyst. Small investors, by contrast, react insignificantly to the forecasts of 
unaffiliated analysts and significantly negatively to the forecasts of affiliated analysts. 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007, 2009) use these and other patterns in the data to 
distinguish between explanations of the bias in recommendations based on optimism-driven 
selection effects and those based on strategic distortion. They conclude that strategic distortion is 
the more important factor. Their analyses, which rest mainly on qualitatively patterns in the data, 
might be sharpened and refined by an explicit model of strategic distortion and its effects along 
the lines of a multidimensional generalization of the level-k/CH analyses in Sections 13.1-2.    
 
14. Conclusion 
  This paper has reviewed recent theoretical, experimental, and empirical work on models of 
strategic thinking and surveyed their applications in economics. Better models of strategic 
thinking are important because they can improve predictions of people’s responses to games 
played only once. And when a game is played repeatedly, in a setting where learning will 
plausibly converge to equilibrium, better models of initial responses can yield better predictions 
of the limiting outcomes of history-dependent learning.  
  Although Nash equilibrium can be, and often has been, viewed as a model of strategic 
thinking, experimental research shows with progressively increasing clarity that subjects’ 
responses to novel games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that the deviations 
have a large structural component that can be modeled in a simple way. Subjects’ thinking tends 
to avoid the fixed-point reasoning or indefinitely iterated dominance reasoning that equilibrium 
sometimes requires, in favor of rules of thumb that anchor beliefs in an instinctive reaction to the 
game and then adjust them via a small number of iterated best responses. The resulting level-k or 
cognitive hierarchy models share the generality and much of the tractability of equilibrium 
analysis, but can in many settings systematically out-predict equilibrium.  
  Although level-k or cognitive hierarchy models are alternatives to equilibrium analysis, they 
generalize equilibrium rather than replacing it. In sufficiently simple games the low-level types 
that describe most subjects’ behavior mimic equilibrium strategy choices, even as they deviate   86 
from equilibrium thinking. But in more complex games some or all such types may deviate 
systematically from equilibrium choices, in which case the models identify which settings are 
likely to evoke deviations; what forms they are likely to take; and with what frequencies. These 
conclusions are based mainly on experimental analyses, but a growing number of empirical 
studies using field data from settings where the game can be identified find similar patterns.  
  The paper has also illustrated several ways in which a level-k/cognitive hierarchy analysis 
can help in applications. In settings where the types that best describe most people’s behavior 
mimic equilibrium choices, such an analysis can establish the robustness of equilibrium 
predictions. In settings where it is implausible to assume equilibrium, a level-k/CH analysis can 
challenge equilibrium predictions and resolve empirical puzzles by explaining the deviations 
from equilibrium some games evoke. The paper illustrates these possibilities in applications 
ranging from zero-sum betting and auctions with private information, where a level-k/CH 
analysis explains systematic deviations from equilibrium predictions; to coordination via 
symmetry-breaking, where such an analysis can explain the results of experiments in which 
subjects do systematically better than in the best symmetric equilibrium; coordination via 
assurance, where such an analysis helps to resolve some more subtle puzzles; hide-and-seek, 
outguessing, and coordination games played on non-neutral salience landscapes, where the 
analysis explains systematic patterns in subjects’ strategic uses of salience; and strategic 
communication in “outguessing” and coordination games, where equilibrium gives an inadequate 
account of communication but a level-k/CH analysis some commonly observed patterns. 
  We hope that this survey has shown that structural nonequilibrium models of strategic 
thinking deserve a place in the analyst’s toolkit. 
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